The Effect of the United Nations Convention Against Torture on the Scope of Habeas Review in the Context of International Extradition by King, Evan
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 38, Issue 3 2015 Article 4
The Effect of the United Nations Convention
Against Torture on the Scope of Habeas
Review in the Context of International
Extradition
Evan King∗
∗Fordham University School of Law
Copyright c©2015 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The Effect of the United Nations Convention
Against Torture on the Scope of Habeas
Review in the Context of International
Extradition
Evan King
Abstract
This Note considers the law underlying the question addressed in Trinidad: can habeas courts
review an extraditee’s Article Three claims? In turn, this Note considers how courts should in-
terpret the CAT in the extradition context. Part I explores the important conceptual components
of the question posed in Trinidad,including US extradition practice, habeas petitions in extradi-
tion proceedings, and the CAT’s implementation in the United States. Building on this, Part II
examines competing interpretations of Article Three claims in US courts, highlighting how these
claims touch on much deeper issues that remain unsettled by several hundred years of habeas cor-
pus jurisprudence. Finally, Part III posits a simple answer to the straightforward question posed in
Trinidad. Neither the CAT, its implementing laws or regulations, nor the United States Constitu-
tion allows courts to hear an extraditee’s Article Three claims. Therefore, unless Congress changes
the current state of the law, Article Three claims are the exclusive purview of the Secretary.
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, the United States implemented the UN Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (“CAT”) and made a commitment not to extradite a 
person to a country where there was a substantial risk that the 
individual would face torture pursuant to Article Three of the CAT.1 
                                                            
1. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT] (declaring, in Article Three: 
“No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture.”); Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reps. Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 19 of the CAT, Addendum: United States of America, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 
(Feb. 9, 2000) [hereinafter United States Report to CAT] (stating that the United States ratified 
the CAT in October of 1994 and that it entered into force on November 20, 1994). While the 
CAT entered into force in 1994, it took several years before it became law in the United States 
because it was not considered self-executing. See United States Report to CAT, supra, ¶¶ 59–
60 (discussing the administrative regulations that discuss Article Three of the CAT); see also 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring (“FARR”) Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, § 2242, 
112 Stat. 2681, 882 (1998) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012)) (requiring the 
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Many international fugitives (“extraditees”) have claimed in US 
courts that their extradition would violate Article Three (“Article 
Three claims”).2 This Note follows one extraditee’s case from 
beginning to end to examine the current state of the law in the United 
States. The law is clear: although Article Three claims are serious and 
substantial, Article Three determinations are the exclusive purview of 
the Secretary of State, not the Judiciary. 
On October 8, 2004, Hedelito Trinidad y Garcia was arrested in 
the Central District of California pursuant to a federal complaint that 
sought his extradition to the Philippines for allegedly conspiring to 
kidnap for ransom.3 After several years of litigation, a US magistrate 
judge certified his extradition.4 Trinidad y Garcia fought his 
extradition on several fronts.5 He petitioned then-Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, to deny the Philippines’ request on the grounds 
                                                                                                                                     
appropriate federal agencies to prescribe regulations to implement US obligations under 
Article Three of the CAT). 
2. See, e.g., Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 955–57 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(rehearing en banc) (per curiam) (requesting judicial review, in habeas, of the Secretary of 
State’s Article Three determination); Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 666, 676–77 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (same). For a video recording of the Ninth Circuit (en banc) oral augments in 
Trinidad, see United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 09–56999 Trinidad y 
Garcia v Benov (June 23, 2011), http://youtu.be/GdGzu--hfPU. 
3. See Garcia v. Benov, 715 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (explaining that the 
complaint for Trinidad y Garcia’s arrest pursuant to the extradition request was sought on 
December 18, 2003, and that Trinidad y Garcia was ultimately arrested and arraigned on this 
complaint on October 8, 2004). 
4. See id. (stating that a US Magistrate Judge filed Trinidad y Garcia’s Certification of 
Extraditability on September 7, 2007). After Trinidad y Garcia’s Certification of 
Extraditability was issued by a federal magistrate judge, his first habeas petition was heard and 
ultimately denied on July 16, 2008, by the District Court for the Central District of California. 
See id. at 980 (discussing the first habeas denial, No. CV 07-6387-MMM, dkt. no. 43). 
Subsequently, in September 2008, the Secretary of State issued a Surrender Warrant, 
authorizing Trinidad y Garcia’s extradition. See id. To fight the Secretary’s decision, Trinidad 
y Garcia filed a second habeas petition. See Garcia v. Benov, No. CV 08-07719-MMM (CW), 
2009 WL 4250694, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2009). The District Court granted this habeas 
petition, noting that because the Secretary of State refused to comply with court orders 
requiring the Secretary to disclose the evidence used by the State Department in the decision to 
issue a Surrender Warrant, the court had no way to find the Secretary’s decision was supported 
by any substantial evidence. See id. at *6. The Government appealed this decision. See Brief 
for Appellee at 27–29, Trinidad y Garcia v. Benov, No. 09-56999 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2010). A 
panel of judges on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s decision. See 
Trinidad y Garcia v. Benov, 395 F. App’x 329, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17840, at *332 (9th 
Cir. 2010), vacated, 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en banc) (per curiam).  
5. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 4, at 24–25 (discussing Trinidad y Garcia’s 
submission to the Secretary of State, but noting that Trinidad y Garcia was denied the 
opportunity to appear before any decision making body at the State Department). 
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that he would face torture at the hands of Filipino officials upon his 
return, in violation of the United States’ obligations under the CAT.6 
Under Article Three of the CAT, the United States may not extradite 
anyone who faces a “substantial risk” of torture at the hands of the 
country seeking extradition (the “requesting State”).7  In 2008, after 
reviewing Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three claim, Secretary Rice 
determined that Trinidad y Garcia did not face a substantial risk of 
torture upon his return and authorized his surrender to the 
Philippines.8   
Trinidad y Garcia sought judicial review of the Secretary’s 
Article Three determination by petitioning for a writ of habeas 
corpus.9 A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a form of collateral 
appeal that extraditees have used to challenge the legality of their 
detention by arguing that international law prevents the United States 
from extraditing the petitioner to the requesting State.10 After the 
district court granted Trinidad y Garcia’s habeas petition and ordered 
his release, the government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which later 
heard the case en banc.11 The Ninth Circuit addressed a 
straightforward, but significant question: should Trinidad y Garcia be 
able to demand judicial review, in habeas, of the Secretary’s Article 
Three determination under the CAT?12  
                                                            
6. See id. at 7–9, 26 (explaining that authorities in the Philippines obtained a confession 
by suffocating, electrocuting, and threatening the family of one of the co-defendants); see also 
Caroline Stover, Note, Torture and Extradition: Using Trinidad y Garcia to Develop a New 
Role for the Courts, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 325, 326 (2013–2014) (same). 
7. See CAT, supra note 1, art. III.  
8. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 4, at 24–25 (explaining that Trinidad y Garcia’s 
counsel learned of the existence of his Surrender Warrant on September 12, 2008); accord 22 
C.F.R. § 95.3 (requiring the Secretary of State to make an Article Three determination prior to 
issuing a Surrender Warrant).  
9. See Garcia v. Benov, 715 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (interpreting Trinidad 
y Garcia’s habeas petition as arguing that his extradition would violate federal law and the 
CAT); cf. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND 
PRACTICE 930 (6th ed. 2014) (emphasizing that a certificate of extraditability is not a final 
order within the meaning 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and so the only available appeal is through a writ 
of habeas corpus). 
10. See MICHAEL ABBELL, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 
284 (2010) (emphasizing that habeas is the normal recourse to challenge a Certificate of 
Extraditability); see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 930 (explaining that a limited appeal is 
available to extraditees through habeas corpus); id. at 936–37 (listing the commonly 
understood issues reviewable in habeas review of extradition hearings). 
11. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
12. In the five separate opinions, the Ninth Circuit exemplified the existing discord and 
confusion surrounding a seemingly straightforward question. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 
683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en banc) (per curiam). 
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Trinidad y Garcia had asked the district court to examine all the 
evidence underlying the Secretary’s decision regarding his claim.13 In 
Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the district court had jurisdiction to review Trinidad y Garcia’s 
Article Three claim, splitting with every other circuit that had 
addressed this question.14 The court also held, however, that the scope 
of the district court’s habeas review was strictly limited.15 Instead, the 
court held that the Executive was in a better position to review the 
underlying evidence, so the district court could only require the 
Secretary to submit a declaration to the court with her assurances that 
she had complied with her statutory duties and had “take[n] into 
account all relevant considerations . . . .”16  Some scholars have 
argued that this outcome, which grants sweeping authority to the 
Executive, exemplifies problems with a lack of judicial review in 
extradition cases more broadly and demonstrates the need for a much 
broader judicial fact-finding role for Article Three claims.17  
This Note considers the law underlying the question addressed in 
Trinidad: can habeas courts review an extraditee’s Article Three 
                                                            
13. See id. at 955–56 (explaining that Trinidad y Garcia argued his surrender would 
violate the CAT); Brief for Appellee at 25, Garcia v. Benov, 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(No. 09-56999) (explaining that Trinidad y Garcia’s second habeas petition challenged the 
validity of the Secretary’s Article Three determination).  
14. Compare Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956 (holding that the district court had jurisdiction 
over Trinidad y Garcia’s petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241), with id. at 969 (Tallman, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the court’s per curiam ruling created a circuit split), and Stover, supra 
note 6, at 327 (pointing out that the Trinidad decision “for the first time extended judicial 
review of habeas corpus petitions in extradition cases to [the Article Three 
determinations] . . . .”). 
15. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956–57 (instructing the Secretary of State, upon remand, to 
provide a declaration that she “complied with her obligations”). But see Steve Vladeck, Why 
the “Munaf Sequels” Matter: A Primer on FARRA, REAL ID, and the Role of the Courts in 
Transfer/Extradition Cases, LAWFARE (June 12, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://
www.lawfareblog.com/2012/06/why-the-Munaf-sequels-matter (dismissing the per curiam’s 
proposed relief and saying that “merely by filing a piece of paper, the Executive Branch can 
make these cases go away . . .”). 
16. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 957 (holding that an extraditee possesses a narrow liberty 
interest and is entitled to no more than a judicial finding that the Secretary complied with her 
statutory and regulatory obligations). These relevant considerations include, “pattern[s] of 
gross, flagrant, or mass violations of humans rights.”  22 C.F.R. § 95.2(a)(2) (2013).  
17. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 15; Stover, supra note 6; Brenna D. Nelinson, 
Comment, From Boumediene to Garcia: The United States’ (Non)compliance with the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Its Movement Away from Meaningful Review, 29 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 209, 250–52 (2013) (concluding that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Trinidad 
gave too much discretion to the Executive Branch, and proposing a “Rule of Limited-Inquiry” 
like the one proposed in Judge Thomas’s Concurrence, Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 958–61, 
[Thomas, J., concurring]). 
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claims? In turn, this Note considers how courts should interpret the 
CAT in the extradition context. Part I explores the important 
conceptual components of the question posed in Trinidad, including 
US extradition practice, habeas petitions in extradition proceedings, 
and the CAT’s implementation in the United States. Building on this, 
Part II examines competing interpretations of Article Three claims in 
US courts, highlighting how these claims touch on much deeper 
issues that remain unsettled by several hundred years of habeas 
corpus jurisprudence. Finally, Part III posits a simple answer to the 
straightforward question posed in Trinidad. Neither the CAT, its 
implementing laws or regulations, nor the United States Constitution 
allows courts to hear an extraditee’s Article Three claims. Therefore, 
unless Congress changes the current state of the law, Article Three 
claims are the exclusive purview of the Secretary.  
I. BACKGROUND ON US EXTRADITION LAW, THE CAT, AND 
HABEAS CORPUS 
In Trinidad, the Ninth Circuit considered many complex issues 
relating to the scope of habeas corpus protections, international 
extradition, and statutory interpretation.18 Part I.A begins with a 
preliminary overview of US extradition practice, noting that it is a 
unique process in which extraditees have historically limited options 
to appeal the government’s decision to extradite.19 Subsequently, Part 
I.B discusses the CAT and its implementation in the United States, 
which formed the basis of Trinidad y Garcia’s amended habeas 
petition.20 Finally, Part I.C provides a discussion of habeas corpus law 
in the United States and the relevant US Supreme Court cases that 
demonstrate how lower courts have attempted to apply the CAT in 
Article Three claims like Trinidad y Garcia’s.21 
A. Extradition Practice in the United States 
International extradition is the formal process by which States 
request the return of fugitives who have fled their jurisdiction, for the 
                                                            
18. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 952. 
19. See infra notes 22–33 and accompanying text. 
20. See Garcia v. Benov, 715 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also infra notes 
34–61 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra Part I.C. 
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purpose of compelling their attendance in court.22 If an extraditee is 
found in the United States, the requesting State submits a formal 
extradition request via diplomatic channels for the extraditee’s 
surrender, and the Department of Justice and the Department of State 
review the request for compliance with applicable statutes and 
treaties.23 If the extradition request survives this initial review, the 
Justice Department files a complaint in the appropriate US district 
court seeking a warrant for the extraditee’s arrest.24 Once 
apprehended, the extraditee is brought before an extradition 
magistrate for an extradition hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184.25 
An extradition hearing is not a criminal trial on the merits but 
rather is a unique process unto itself.26 Conducting a complete trial to 
approve extradition would be counterintuitive, and would require the 
requesting State to come to the United States to present its 
argument.27  As a result, many familiar procedures in US criminal 
                                                            
22. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 2 (summarizing that extradition is a formal process 
where an extraditee is surrendered by the requested State to the requesting State based upon an 
existing treaty, norms of international reciprocity and comity, or on the basis of a State’s 
domestic laws); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-15.700 
(1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov (describing international extradition as a process 
where a person found in country is surrendered to another for trial or punishment). 
23. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 186 (explaining that formal extradition requests are 
made through the diplomatic channels, from an embassy to the Department of State, and that 
Provisional Arrest Requests, which are made from the requesting State’s Ministry of Justice 
Directly to the Justice Department are the product of “recent extradition treaties”); UNITED 
STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 22, at 9-15.700 (outlining the review procedure for 
foreign extraditions requests within the Department of Justice). 
24. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 188 (establishing that, in practice, all extradition 
complaints today are filed by an Assistant United States Attorney in the district where the 
extraditee is found); UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 22 at 9-15.700 
(directing that once the extradition request is sent to the Assistant United States Attorney, he or 
she should then obtain a warrant for the extraditee’s arrest). 
25. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 26–27 (footnotes omitted) (referring to the judges and 
magistrate judges who conduct extradition proceedings as “extradition magistrates”); 18 
U.S.C. § 3184 (authorizing extradition magistrates to conduct hearings to examine the 
requesting State’s “evidence of criminality” against the extraditee). 
26. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 189 (referring to the unique nature of extradition 
proceedings); BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 880 (explaining the sui generis nature of extradition 
hearings). 
27. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 906 (explaining that it is well-established that 
extradition proceedings are not meant to determine guilt or innocence); id. at 880 (noting that 
the scope of an extradition hearing is to determine that: a valid extradition treaty exists 
between the United States and the requesting State; the extraditee is the person sought; the 
charged offense is extraditable; the charge satisfies the dual criminality requirement; there is 
probable cause to believe the extraditee committed the charged offense; the evidence is 
sufficient to support probable cause; the required documents have been presented in 
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trials, such as the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of 
Criminal or Civil Procedure, are absent in extradition hearings.28 
Lastly, because extradition is not meant to be a full trial, the 
extradition magistrate must only find that there is probable cause that 
the fugitive committed the charged offenses, rather than the familiar 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.29 
After finding that the extraditee committed the charged 
offense(s), the extradition magistrate certifies the extradition to the 
Secretary, who undertakes a substantive review of the extradition 
request and the expected treatment of the extraditee in the requesting 
State.30 If the Secretary approves extradition, she issues a Surrender 
Warrant, authorizing extradition to the requesting country.31 An 
extradition magistrate’s Certificate of Extraditability is not considered 
a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and therefore 
may not be directly appealed.32 Instead, an extraditee may collaterally 
attack the Certificate by petitioning the district court for a writ of 
habeas corpus.33 At issue in Trinidad, and many other extraditees’ 
habeas petitions, is the scope of habeas review under the CAT.  
                                                                                                                                     
accordance with US law, any treaty requirements, duly translated, and authenticated by US 
consul); ABBELL, supra note 10, at 272–75 (same). 
28. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 189, 191 (noting that neither the United States 
extradition legislation, nor the Bail Reform Act of 1984, provides for bail of extraditees); 
BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 900 (explaining that hearings are not subject to the Federal Rules 
of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure). 
29. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 96 (explaining that the level of proof in extradition 
hearings should not vary, “irrespective of the law of the state[s involved]”); BASSIOUNI, supra 
note 9, at 881 (quoting Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911)) (explaining that 
extradition magistrates are bound by treaty to presume the trial in the requesting State will be 
fair, and should therefore only look for reasonable grounds of guilt); Miles v. United States, 
103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880) (articulating, for the first time, the requirement that the State must 
prove all elements of a crime “to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt” in criminal trials). 
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (stating that upon the Extradition Magistrate’s certification, “a 
warrant may issue . . . for the surrender of such person” by the Secretary of State) (emphasis 
added); ABBELL, supra note 10, at 300–04 (pointing out that the Secretary’s review of the 
extradition de novo and the Department of State generally considers any submissions from the 
extraditee, although it consistently refuses to grant the extraditee any sort of oral hearing). 
31. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 295 (describing a surrender warrant as a required 
document, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3186, needed to effectuate an extraditee’s extradition); 
BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 986 (same). 
32. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 45 (citing In re Extradition of Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 
127–28 (2d Cir. 1991)) (noting that decisions denying or granting extradition requests are nor 
not appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291); BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 930 (same); see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district 
courts of the United States . . . .”).  
33. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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B. United Nations Convention Against Torture 
The CAT has imposed significant legal obligations on the United 
States and has often been invoked by extraditees seeking to prevent 
their extradition to the requesting State.34 The Convention was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1984, and entered into force 
in 1987.35 It is the only binding international convention exclusively 
concerned with eliminating torture.36 The CAT’s preamble expresses 
the desire of the State signatories to “make more effective the 
struggles against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment and punishment throughout the world.”37 Part I.B.1 
provides background on Article Three, which expands the CAT’s 
protections by preventing signatories from transferring individuals to 
any State where their torture is likely.38 Next, Part I.B.2 discusses the 
CAT’s implementation in the United States and provides the 
legislative history necessary to put US policy into perspective.  
                                                            
34. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 95.3 (requiring the Secretary to consider all allegations of 
torture in extradition cases); Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 666–67 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(discussing the history of the CAT in the United States). In practice, however, the CAT’s new 
legal obligations have not changed the practice of the US Government of refusing extradition 
if torture is likely. See Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Foreign 
Relations, 101st Cong. 12–18 (1990) (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, 18) [hereinafter Statement of Mark 
Richard] (explaining that the Secretary of State is the “competent authority” under existing 
law, and that the United States did not and would never extradite a person to a country where it 
was known he would be tortured). 
35. Oona A. Hathaway, Aileen Nowlan & Julia Spiegel, Tortured Reasoning: The Intent 
to Torture Under International and Domestic Law, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 791, 798 (2011–2012) 
(discussing the history of the CAT’s creation); C.W. WOUTERS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
STANDARDS FOR THE PROTECTION FROM REFOULMENT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS ON THE 
PROHIBITIONS ON REFOULMENT CONTAINED IN THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, THE EUROPEAN 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, AND 
THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 426 (2009) (same). 
36. See LENE WENDLAND, ASSOCIATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE, A 
HANDBOOK ON STATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 66 
(2002) (referring to the prohibition on torture as jus cogens, an indelible customary law that 
cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence); WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 30 (citations 
omitted) (same). 
37. See CAT, supra note 1, pmbl. 
38. See AHCENE BOULESBASS, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE 
PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 219–20 (explaining that Article Three’s protections extends to 
all persons); J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER 
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 126 (noting that Article 
Three’s language was intended to cover all conceivable types of transfers of an individual 
between States).  
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1. Article Three of the CAT and Extradition 
The CAT imposed several obligations on the ratifying States 
and, in the extradition context, Article Three is the most significant.39  
Not only does the CAT require States to penalize torture, but it also 
seeks to prevent instances of torture by prohibiting the transfer of 
individuals to States where they face a “substantial” risk of torture.40  
Article Three, Paragraph One of the CAT provides: “No State Party 
shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture.”41 This right is non-derogable, or 
absolute, and “competent authorities” within a State must ensure 
compliance.42 By explicitly mentioning expulsion, refoulment, and 
extradition, Article Three was drafted to protect individuals from 
every conceivable type of physical transfer between States.43   
During the CAT’s drafting, the drafters noted the importance of 
sufficiently clarifying who should be the “competent authorities.”44 
Even outside of the Article Three context, procedural guarantees and 
legal remedies such as habeas corpus were seen as a valuable tool to 
prevent torture.45 Ultimately, however, the drafters recognized the 
                                                            
39. See Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 14 (stating the Article Three will 
likely have the most day-to-day impact on US law enforcement); CHRIS INGLESE, THE UN 
COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, AN ASSESSMENT 83 (discussing the CAT’s new obligation 
on States to prevent torture in addition to the already existing obligations not to torture). 
40. See CAT supra note 1, art. 3, ¶ 1; WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 460 (citations 
omitted) (explaining that “substantial grounds” in Article Three means that the risk of torture 
must be assessed by the State party in question in a manner that requires more than mere 
suspicion, but less than a high probability); WENDLAND, supra note 36, at 33 (stating that a 
substantial ground for believing in the possibility of torture is a factual one). 
41. See CAT, supra note 1, art. 3, ¶ 1.  
42. See id. art. 3, ¶ 2 (discussing the role of “competent authorities”); see also MANFRED 
NOWAK & ELIZABETH MCARTHUR, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: 
A COMMENTARY 147–48 (observing that the protections of Article Three are considered 
absolute, as demonstrated by the CAT’s lack of exclusion or derogation clauses); WENDLAND, 
supra note 36, at 33 (describing Article Three’s protections as absolute). 
43. See BOULESBASS, supra note 38, at 219–20 (explaining that Article Three’s 
protections extends to all persons); BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 38, at 126 (explaining 
the drafters’ intent regarding the types of physical transfers protected by the CAT). 
44. See NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 42, at 143 (discussing the deliberations of the 
drafting committee regarding Article Three, Paragraph Two of the CAT); U.N. Econ. and Soc. 
Council, Report of the Working Grp. on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶¶ 20–21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72, 
(Mar. 9, 1984) (same). 
45. See U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment: Report by the Special Rapporteur, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15 
(Feb. 19, 1986) (explaining the value of national procedural guarantees or legal remedies like 
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diverse set of national systems governed by the CAT, so the language 
was left broad.46 When competent authorities make decisions within 
the meaning of Article Three, the drafters envisioned individualized 
determinations.47 And while proposed versions of the text included 
lists of factors to consider, they were ultimately discarded for fear of 
appearing exhaustive.48 The final version of the text requires 
competent authorities to take into account all relevant considerations 
when analyzing allegations of torture in the requesting State.49 
2. United States Implementation of its Article Three Obligations  
The CAT entered into force in the United States on November 
20, 1994.50 Before ratification, officials from George H.W. Bush’s 
                                                                                                                                     
habeas corpus in preventing the torture of arrested individuals). Article Seventeen of the CAT 
created the Committee Against Torture, an autonomous treaty body in the UN System that 
monitors the implementation and enforcement of States’ obligations under the CAT. See 
WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 426; see also WENDLAND, supra note 36, at 17. Article Twenty-
two of the CAT allows the Committee to hear complaints from individuals alleging CAT 
violations against States. See CAT, supra note 1, art. 22; WENDLAND, supra note 36, at 18. 
The Committee’s views are only declaratory, not binding, and the CAT does not provide the 
Committee any kind of enforcement mechanism. See WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 429–30. 
However, the views of the Committee provide valuable insight into the international 
community’s current interpretation of the treaty. See, e.g., WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 521 
(explaining that, as of the date of publication, 2009, no case had been brought to the 
Committee alleging an Article Three violation based upon a single fact). 
46. See NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 42, at 228 (stating that “Competent 
Authorities” refers to administrative or judicial bodies, but given the gravity of the decision to 
surrender, judicial review of all determinations is preferable); WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 516 
(citations omitted) (explaining that the United Nations has not specifically delineated what 
authorities may be competent within the meaning of Article Three, but has said that the 
authority, which need not be part of the Judiciary, should be independent and impartial). 
47. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 38, at 51 (recounting the importance of 
individualized torture determinations); CAT, supra note 1, art. 3, ¶ 2 (“For the purpose of 
determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account 
all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of 
a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights”). 
48. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 38, at 54 (discussing the proposed text of the 
International Commission of Jurists, which listed patterns of gross violations of human rights, 
such as those resulting from genocide or discrimination, as factors to consider); id. at 56 
(explaining that many State delegations on the drafting committee favored the deletion of 
proposed text providing specific examples of situations which may present a risk of torture, for 
fear of appearing to exclude non-listed factors). 
49. See CAT, supra note 1, art. 3, ¶ 2 (emphasis added); WENDLAND, supra note 36, at 
33 (explaining that the general human rights conditions of the requesting State should be 
considered, but that those general conditions, alone, cannot be sufficient to satisfy Article 
Three, as all determinations must be individualized). 
50. See United States Report to CAT, supra note 1, ¶ 3 (discussing the CAT’s ratification 
in the United States); Isaac A. Linnartz, Note, The Siren Song of Interrogational Torture: 
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administration recommended that the Senate formally adopt an 
understanding of Article Three that interpreted the “substantial risk” 
standard as preventing transfer whenever torture was “more likely 
than not,” which is the same standard employed in asylum 
proceedings.51 Lawmakers explained Article Three would not change 
the current US practice whereby the Secretary of State was the 
“competent authority” to ensure that extradition never occurred 
whenever torture was more likely than not.52 Lawmakers further 
noted that Article Three would not alter current practice of exempting 
the Secretary’s Article Three determinations from judicial review.53 
Because the CAT was not considered self-executing, it would 
not be binding law in the United States without implementing 
legislation.54 The United States implemented its CAT obligations on 
October 21, 1998, when the Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act (the “FARR Act”) was signed into law.55  Section 
2242(a) of the FARR Act declared that “it shall be the policy of the 
United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the 
involuntary return of any person to a country where there are 
                                                                                                                                     
Evaluating the U.S. Implementation of the U.N. Convention Against Torture, 57 DUKE L.J. 
1485, 1495–1503 (2008). 
51. See id.; see also Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (recommending 
that Article Three’s prohibitions apply where torture is “more likely than not,” the same 
standard applied in US asylum proceedings); Linnartz, supra note 50, at 1496 (noting the State 
Department’s “more likely than not” standard for Article Three determinations in extradition 
cases). 
52. See Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (reporting that the Secretary of 
State is the “competent authority” under existing law, and that the United States did not and 
would never extradite a person to a country where it was known he would be tortured); 
Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the Comm. On Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 
69–72 (1990) (letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S. 
Dept. of State, to Sen. Clairborne Pell) (clarifying that the Secretary will remain the competent 
authority in extradition).  
53. See Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (explaining that the Secretary of 
State’s Article Three decisions are not subject to judicial review); 22 C.F.R. § 95.4 
(describing the Secretary’s Article Three Determinations as matters of Executive discretion, 
not subject to judicial review). 
54. 136 Cong. Rec. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Statement of Sen. Terry Sanford 
that “Articles 1 through 16 of the [CAT] are not self-executing”); Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 
1173, 1180 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (emphasizing that, because the CAT was 
not self-executing, it did not create any judicially-enforceable rights without some 
congressional legislation). But see United States Report to CAT, supra note 1, ¶ 57 (citations 
omitted) (explaining that US courts may take notice of US obligations under a non-self-
executing treaty). 
55. See Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 648–49 (3d Cir. 2006) (“On October 21, 
1998, the President signed into law the [FARR Act].”); United States Report to CAT, supra 
note 1, ¶ 168 (discussing the FARR Act’s enactment).  
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substantial grounds for believing the person [would be subjected to] 
torture.”56 Section 2242(d) discusses judicial review and explicitly 
states that the FARR Act did not provide courts with jurisdiction to 
hear Article Three claims outside the immigration context, which 
reaffirmed existing extradition practice.57 
Pursuant to § 2242(b) of the FARR Act, several federal agencies 
implemented regulations setting forth how the broad statutory 
language would go into effect.58 Those regulations stated that the 
Secretary was the official responsible for determining whether to 
surrender an individual in the extradition context, and that those 
determinations were not subject to judicial review.59 While the 
regulations state that the Secretary’s Article Three determinations are 
not subject to judicial review, no Secretary has ever interpreted this to 
mean that he or she can surrender a fugitive who faces a substantial 
likelihood of torture, “[regardless of any] foreign policy interests . . . 
[that] would be served by an extradition.”60 Subsequently, the United 
States’ Article Three obligations were further clarified in the REAL 
ID Act of 2005, which states, “notwithstanding any other provision of 
law . . . or habeas corpus provision . . . a petition for review filed with 
the appropriate court of appeals shall be the sole and exclusive means 
for judicial review of any [Immigration] cause or claim under the 
[CAT].”61 
                                                            
56. See FARR Act, supra note 1. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. (requiring administrative agencies to prescribe regulations to implement 
Article Three’s obligations); accord 22 C.F.R. § 95.1-4 (implementing regulations). 
59. See 95 C.F.R. § 95.2(b) (“. . . the Secretary is the U.S. official responsible for 
determining whether to surrender a fugitive to a foreign country by means of extradition.”); 95 
C.F.R. § 95.4 (“Decisions of the Secretary concerning surrender of fugitives for extradition are 
matters of Executive discretion not subject to judicial review.”).  
60. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 989 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en banc) 
(Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (per curiam) (quoting State Department 
brief); Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 671 (4th Cir. 2007). The Mironescu court stated: 
Moreover, the Government concedes that the FARR Act precluded the Secretary 
from extraditing Mironescu to Romania . . . if he was likely to be tortured there. 
(citing Br. for the Appellants at 14) (noting that, in its argument before the district 
court “[t]he Government recognized that the Secretary of State is bound by the 
policy of the [CAT] as implemented by US domestic legislation and State 
Department regulations, and that Mironescu thus could not be extradited to Romania 
if it was likely he would indeed be tortured there”).  
Id. 
61. The REAL ID ACT of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, div. B, § 106(a)(4), May 11, 2005, 119 
Stat. 310–11, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 note.  
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C. The Suspension Clause and the Scope of Habeas Corpus 
Protections 
Because a Certificate of Extraditibility is not directly appealable, 
extraditees may challenge it only through a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.62 The writ of habeas corpus—Latin for “that you have 
the body”—originated in England at common law and is one of the 
most fundamental methods for any prisoner to challenge their 
detention.63 Extending habeas protections to the United States was so 
important to the nation’s founders that Article One of the Constitution 
explicitly protects habeas corpus in the Suspension Clause.64 Today 
the protections of the writ also are codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 
which grants courts jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions when the 
petitioner’s custody violates US laws, treaties, or the Constitution.65 
Scholars and jurists have struggled with the exact contours of the 
kinds of claims that implicate the Suspension Clause and therefore are 
protected by the Constitution.66 As the fractured Ninth Circuit opinion 
in Trinidad demonstrates, the CAT adds another dimension to the 
puzzle.67 
                                                            
62.  See ABBELL, supra note 10 at 284 (emphasizing that habeas is the normal recourse 
to challenge a Certificate of Extraditability); BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 930 (explaining that 
a limited appeal is available to extraditees through habeas corpus); supra note 10 and 
accompanying text. 
63.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 611 (Abridged 9th ed. 2009); see Brandon L. Garrett, 
Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 57–58 (2012) (arguing that the 
“traditional purpose of habeas corpus is elemental but powerful: to allow a judge to review the 
legality of a prisoner’s detention”). See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739–46 
(2008) (providing a historical account of the writ’s development at common law and its role in 
the US Constitution). 
64. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it.”); see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739 (explaining that habeas protections were one of the 
“few safeguards of liberty” in the original Constitution).  
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1949) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a 
prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States . . . .”). 
66. See Garrett, supra note 63, at 71–73 (discussing the varying scope of habeas corpus 
protections in various contexts); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 773 (explaining that Supreme Court 
case law does not contain an extensive discussion of the standards defining suspension of the 
writ). 
67. Compare Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(rehearing en banc) (per curiam) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hear 
Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three Claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241), with id. at 1009–15 
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three claim did not 
implicate the Suspension Clause and therefore that it was not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 
2241). 
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Part I.C.1 describes and elaborates on the most common 
definition of the Suspension Clause’s protections employed by the US 
Supreme Court: “[A]t the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause 
protects the writ as it existed in 1789.”68 Which rights of a detainee 
were protected by the writ in 1789 is up for debate and can vary 
widely depending on how a particular claim is framed.69 This 
definition also demonstrates the Court’s intent not to foreclose the 
possibility that the constitutional protections of the Suspension Clause 
can expand beyond what existed in 1789.70 This Section uses two 
seminal Supreme Court cases, St. Cyr and Boumediene, to 
demonstrate how the Court has viewed the scope of Suspension 
Clause protections. Part I.C.2 builds off of this framework, returning 
to St. Cyr and Boumediene as evidence of the canon of constitutional 
avoidance the Court employs when reading a statute to alter the 
protections of the Suspension Clause. 
1. Habeas Corpus as a Means of Challenging Executive Detention 
In I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, the US Supreme Court discussed which kinds 
of claims implicate the Suspension Clause and therefore are protected 
by the US Constitution within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241.71 It 
explained that habeas protections are generally considered strongest 
when the Executive Branch detains an individual with little to no 
judicial involvement.72 As such, if a petitioner can successfully frame 
                                                            
68. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 
663–64) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 
(2008) (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301). 
69. How the Court frame the petitioner’s claim can be determinative. For example, in St. 
Cyr, the Court adopted the petitioner’s framing of his claim, as requesting the Court’s review 
of Executive detention, which was historically protected in habeas. By adopting this 
interpretation, the Court necessarily rejected the respondent’s narrower definition of the claim, 
as seeking review of the Executive Branch’s exercise of statutorily granted discretion. See St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301; accord Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 220 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(explaining St. Cyr’s analysis of the writ did not have a narrow focus). 
70. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746 (2008) (emphasizing that “[t]he Court has been 
careful not to foreclose the possibility that the protections of the Suspension Clause have 
expanded . . .” since 1789); see also, Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the 
New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 462 n.89 (2010) (describing that 
Supreme Court case law makes it clear that the protections of the Suspension Clause may 
expand with time). But see id. at 467 (describing the criteria used by the Court to determine the 
reach of the Suspension Clause as “functional and highly subjective”). 
71. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 307–08 (summarizing the kinds of claims that were historically 
available in habeas). 
72. See id. at 301 (citation omitted) (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has 
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that 
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his habeas petition as asking for review of Executive detention, he has 
greatly increased the likelihood that a court will find it has 
jurisdiction to hear the claim.73 
In St. Cyr, Enrico St. Cyr, a lawful permanent resident of the 
United States, pled guilty to selling a controlled substance, a 
deportable offense.74 St. Cyr was ordered removable and petitioned 
for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Attorney General 
improperly refused to exercise his discretion to waive his removal 
order.75 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“I.N.S.”) argued 
that, historically, habeas corpus was unavailable to review the 
Executive’s exercise of statutorily granted discretion and, as a result, 
St. Cyr had no basis to bring a habeas petition.76 The Supreme Court 
found the I.N.S.’ historical argument “not insubstantial,” but held that 
even if it assumed the Suspension Clause protected the writ only as it 
existed in 1789, there was still ample evidence habeas review was 
appropriate.77 The Court framed the issue more broadly than the 
narrow immigration question presented and instead focused on the 
scope of habeas review of Executive detention and held that, as such, 
St. Cyr presented an issue that common law habeas courts could have 
addressed in 1789, thus implicating the Suspension Clause.78 The 
Court explained that because this was the kind of claim that 
implicated the Suspension Clause, reading a statute to strip courts of 
habeas jurisdiction would raise difficult constitutional questions, 
                                                                                                                                     
its protections have been strongest.”); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 741 (noting that by the 1600’s 
in England, the writ was seen as a restraint upon the King’s power).  
73. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en 
banc) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (per curiam) (explaining that, by interpreting Trinidad 
y Garcia’s Article Three claim as a challenge on Executive detention, his colleagues in other 
jurisdictions viewed it “at too high a level of generality”). 
74.  See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293; see also, Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR), UNITED 
STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/
lawful-permanent-resident-lpr (last visited Jan. 5, 2015) (defining a lawful permanent resident 
as a non-US citizen with authorization to live and work in the United States on a permanent 
basis). 
75. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293. 
76. See id. at 303 (noting that the I.N.S. was arguing in the case at bar that St. Cyr’s 
claim fell outside the traditional scope of habeas). 
77. Id. at 304 (discussing Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953), where the Court held 
that a claim similar to St. Cyr’s was appropriate in habeas); id. (holding that “at the absolute 
minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ as it existed in 1789”). 
78. See id. at 304 (challenging the I.N.S.’s proposed interpretation of St. Cyr’s claim); 
Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 220 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining St. Cyr’s analysis of 
the writ did not have a narrow focus). 
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which courts are compelled to avoid under the canon of constitutional 
avoidance.79  
This issue of constitutional avoidance and habeas protection in 
the international context was raised several years later in Boumediene 
v. Bush.80 After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
Department of Defense established Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals (“CSRTs”), which were charged with determining whether 
or not individuals detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were “enemy 
combatants.”81 Petitioners were a group of aliens detained in 
Guantanamo Bay who claimed that they had a right to seek judicial 
review by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus.82 The Government 
countered that, as noncitizens detained abroad, the petitioners had no 
constitutional rights and therefore no privilege of habeas corpus.83 
The Government further argued that the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005 (“DTA”) and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”) 
provided adequate non-judicial procedures for review and stripped 
courts of their jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ claims in habeas.84  
The Court began by determining whether the Suspension Clause, 
which protects habeas corpus rights, applied to the facts at hand.85 
According to the majority, the petitioners were essentially asking 
whether the Constitution permitted the indefinite detention of enemy 
                                                            
79. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305 (“It necessarily follows that a serious Suspension Clause 
issue would be presented if we were to accept the I.N.S.’[s] submission that the 1996 statutes 
have withdrawn [habeas review] from federal judges and provided no adequate substitute for 
its exercise.”); see also id. at 336 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the canon of 
constitutional avoidance requires judges to presume that Congress would not enact a statute 
that violates the Constitution). 
80. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787–88 (2008). 
81. Id. at 733–34 (2008) (describing the post-9/11 creation of CSTRs). Once an 
individual was labeled an “enemy combatant,” the US Department of Defense could detain 
that person “for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured . . . .” Id. at 
733 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)). 
82. See id. at 746 (providing factual background for the case); id. at 733 (describing the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”)), § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 50 U.S.C. § 1541, 
which authorized the President to use a wide variety of tools to combat those who perpetrated 
the September 11, 2011 terrorist attacks). 
83. See id. at 739. 
84. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148 §1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2741, 
amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (providing procedures for review of status 
of aliens detained as enemy combatants); Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. 109-366 §7(a), 
120 Stat. 2600, 23 U.S.C.A. §2241(e), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008) (granting habeas corpus jurisdiction to aliens detained and determined to be enemy 
combatants, or awaiting such determination); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33. 
85. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739 (inquiring whether enemy combatants could invoke the 
protections of the Suspension Clause). 
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combatants, as defined solely by the Executive.86 It explained that 
when the Constitution was drafted, the Suspension Clause was 
interpreted not only to protect against arbitrary suspensions of the 
writ, but also to “guarantee[] an affirmative right to judicial inquiry 
into the causes of detention,”87 and to prevent the “practice of 
arbitrary imprisonments.”88 The Boumediene Court held that the 
Suspension Clause was implicated by the petitioners’ claim, thus 
expanding the Suspension Clause and the right to judicial review in 
habeas to non-citizen enemy combatants detained in Guantanamo 
Bay.89 
2. Congress May Alter the Scope of Habeas Protections  
Once a court decides that a claim implicates the Suspension 
Clause, any law that strips a court’s jurisdiction to hear that claim 
would raise difficult constitutional questions.90 This Section discusses 
the Supreme Court’s attempt to avoid such difficult constitutional 
questions, continuing to rely on St. Cyr and Boumediene as 
examples.91 The language of the statutes at issue in St. Cyr—the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility 
                                                            
86. See id. at 788 (interpreting petitioners’ most basic claim as arguing “that the 
President has no authority under the AUMF to detain them indefinitely”) 
87. Id. at 744 (citations omitted). 
88. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 84. (Alexander Hamilton)) 
89. This was because, although 1789 represented a bare minimum of the Suspension 
Clause’s protections, “[t]he Court ha[d] been careful not to foreclose the possibility that the 
protections of the Suspension Clause have expanded along with post-1789 developments . . . .” 
Id. at 746 (2008) (citing I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 553 U.S. 289, 300–01 (2001)); see Gerald L. 
Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 537, 544 (2010) (arguing that Boumediene demonstrated that “the mandate of the 
Suspension Clause does go beyond the floor of 1789”). 
90. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314 (explaining that reading the statutes at issue in St. Cyr to 
preclude habeas review of a pure question of law would “raise serious constitutional 
questions”); Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 
33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 558 n.17 (2002) (explaining that in a companion case, 
Calcano-Martinez v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 348 (2001), the Court held that no such serious 
constitutional questions were raised by a judicial review provision that which removed habeas 
jurisdiction from the courts of appeals, because habeas remained available in the district 
court). 
91. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299 (explaining that multiple interpretations of a statute are 
possible, but one raises “serious constitutional problems” courts are obligated to interpret the 
statute “to avoid such problems”); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 787 (articulating courts’ 
obligations to construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems). 
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Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”)—was very similar to that of the FARR Act.92 
As such, many lower courts have considered St. Cyr’s analysis highly 
relevant to their analysis of Article Three claims.93 By contrast, 
Boumediene marks the first and only time in US history where the 
Court held that Congress has passed a law stripping habeas 
jurisdiction in violation of the Suspension Clause.94 Therefore, 
Boumediene provides a concrete example of how difficult it is for 
Congress to violate the Suspension Clause by merely stripping habeas 
jurisdiction. 
The Court in St. Cyr explained that to avoid the constitutional 
problems that may arise when a petitioner’s claim implicates the 
Suspension Clause, courts should employ two rules of statutory 
interpretation.95 First, Congress can only strip the courts’ jurisdiction 
to hear that claim with a sufficiently clear statement that “articulate[s] 
specific and unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal [of 
habeas jurisdiction].”96 Second, even where a sufficiently clear 
statement of intent exists, a court will search for an alternative 
interpretation of the statute that would not raise these problems.97   
In applying these two rules to the AEDPA and the IIRIRA, the 
St. Cyr Court held that neither statute removed United States district 
courts’ jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because they failed to 
provide a sufficiently clear statement demonstrating Congress’ intent 
to strip habeas review.98 Further, an alternative interpretation of the 
                                                            
92. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending §212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289. 
93. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 955–957 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing 
en banc) (per curiam) (examining St. Cyr to adjudicate Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three 
claim). But see Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 676 (4th Cir. 2007) (concluding that St. 
Cyr was not dispositive on the Article Three Claim at issue because the FARR Act contained 
no plausible reading that would not strip habeas review, unlike the statutes analyzed in St. 
Cyr). 
94. See Neuman, supra note 89, at 538 (explaining that, before Boumediene, the Court 
had never before found a violation of the Suspension Clause). 
95. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299. 
96. Id. at 289, 299 (citing Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 8 Wall. 85, 102, 19 L. Ed. 332 
(1869), where the Court stated, “We are not at liberty to except from [habeas corpus 
jurisdiction] any cases not plainly excepted by law.”). 
97. See id. at 299 (explaining that multiple interpretations of a statute are possible, but 
one raises “serious constitutional problems” courts are obligated to interpret the statute “to 
avoid such problems”). 
98. See id. at 312–13 (holding that neither statute “speaks with sufficient clarity” to bar 
habeas review). 
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statute that did not raise constitutional problems was available.99 The 
Court considered the text of § 401(e) of the AEDPA, but concluded 
that the text did no more than amend provisions of the 1952 
Immigration and Nationality Act, which made no mention of habeas 
or § 2241.100 Because the text in the AEDPA did not contain a clear 
statement removing habeas jurisdiction, § 401(e)’s title, “Elimination 
of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus,” was irrelevant.101 Further, the 
Court analyzed three different sections of the IIRIRA, §§ 1252(a)(1), 
1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(2)(C).102 The language in each of these 
sections failed to provide clear language effecting repeal of habeas 
jurisdiction, as they only discussed “judicial review” or “jurisdiction 
to review,” which were “historically distinct” from habeas corpus in 
the immigration context.103  
By contrast, in Boumediene, the Court held that the statutes at 
issue not only contained a sufficiently clear statement of Congress’ 
intent to strip habeas jurisdiction, but also that there was no fair 
alternative interpretation of the statute that did not strip habeas 
jurisdiction.104 After holding that the Constitution and, by extension, 
the Suspension Clause had “full effect” in Guantanamo Bay, the 
Court in Boumediene addressed the issue of whether or not § 7 of the 
MCA violated the Suspension Clause by stripping federal courts of 
                                                            
99. Id. at 289, 314 (refusing to adopt the I.N.S.’s interpretation of the statutes, as doing 
so would raise serious constitutional questions).  
100. Section 507(e) of the AEDPA that the Court analyzed read as follows: 
(e) Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus.—Section 106(a) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)) is amended—(1) in 
paragraph (8), by adding ‘and’ at the end; (2) in paragraph (9), by striking; 
‘and’ at the end and inserting a period; and (3) by striking paragraph (10).  
See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308 n.31. 
101. Id. at 308–09 (explaining that a provision’s title is not controlling, and since the text 
did not repeal habeas jurisdiction, the title could not either). 
102. See id. at 309–12 (analyzing § 1252(a)(1), which stated that judicial review of final 
removal orders is governed only by the Hobb’s Act); id. (analyzing § 1252(b)(9), which stated 
that “judicial review of all questions of law and fact and application of constitutional or 
statutory provisions” arising under the subchapter shall only be available in judicial review of 
a final order under this section); id. (analyzing § 1252(a)(2)(C), which stated “Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of 
removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” certain offenses). 
103. See id. at 311. The Court cited several Supreme Court cases that differentiated 
judicial review from habeas corpus in immigration statutes. Id. (citing Heikkila v. Barber, 345 
U.S. 226 (1953)) (“[I]t is the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus that differentiates” habeas 
review from “judicial review.”). 
104. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 736 (2008) (analyzing § 7 of the MCA). 
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jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas claims.105 Because the 
Suspension Clause was implicated, the Court required a clear 
expression of Congressional intent to strip habeas and noted that the 
statutes at issue had such a clear intent as they were clearly enacted 
by Congress to “circumscribe habeas review.”106 Further, there was 
no fair alternative interpretation of the statutes that did not clearly 
remove petitioners’ right to seek habeas relief.107 Without habeas, the 
petitioners’ claims could never be adequately heard, as the non-
judicial review procedures that Congress implemented with the act 
were an inadequate substitute for the writ.108 Absent some acceptable 
alternative forum that could adequately replace habeas review, the 
petitioners’ constitutional rights, as guaranteed by the Suspension 
Clause, had been violated.109 Because of these flaws, the Court held, 
for the first time in the nation’s history, that a law passed by Congress 
improperly attempted to remove the Judiciary’s ability to inquire into 
these traditional questions, and thus, violated the Suspension 
Clause.110 
                                                            
105. Section 7 of the MCA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) to read:  
(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien 
detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to 
have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such 
determination. 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 772 (2008). 
106. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776–77 (noting that the DTA only allows the court of 
appeals to determine whether or not the CSRT complied with review procedure set out by the 
Secretary of Defense—not engage in any de novo review). 
107. See id. at 723, 738–39 (noting that the statute’s text was amended by Congress after 
the Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, and that this legislative response 
made it even clearer that Congress intended a singular construction of this portion of the 
MCA). 
108. See id. at 794 (explaining the existence of suitable alternative processes was a 
“relevant consideration in determining the courts’ role”). The Court also explained that it was 
“troubled” by the fact that the statute did not explicitly allow the Court of Appeals to order the 
detainee released. See id. at 787–88 (assuming that congressional silence on the matter meant 
that the statute would permit release, as it was a “constitutionally required remedy”). 
109. See id. at 733 (holding that § 7 of the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus). 
110. See id. at 770 (recognizing that this decision marked the first time the Court had 
“held that noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which another country 
maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution”); id. at 799 (Souter, J., 
concurring) (“Justice Scalia is thus correct that here, for the first time, this Court holds there is 
. . . constitutional habeas jurisdiction over aliens imprisoned by the military outside an area of 
de jure national sovereignty.”). 
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The Court further explained that although there was little 
precedent that spoke directly to what constituted a removal of habeas 
rights, several factors to consider were: whether the statute at issue 
substantially departed from common law habeas procedures; whether 
the statute applied to proceedings with prior judicial involvement; 
whether the statute’s purpose or effect was to restrict the writ; and 
whether the statute substituted a new collateral review procedure for 
pre-existing habeas corpus procedure.111 
3. Habeas Review in Extradition is Governed by the Rule of Non-
Inquiry 
In contrast to the traditional scope of habeas review addressed in 
the enemy combatant context of Boumediene or the immigration 
context of St. Cyr, the scope of habeas review in the extradition 
context has traditionally been limited by the Rule of Non-Inquiry.112 
This common law doctrine bars habeas courts that review extradition 
decisions from considering the “procedures or treatment” that an 
extraditee may face upon surrender to the requesting State.113 When 
the Supreme Court formally adopted the Rule of Non-Inquiry in the 
early twentieth century in Neely v. Henkel, it explained that even US 
citizens who commit crimes abroad cannot complain to US courts 
when they are “required to submit to such modes of trial and to such 
                                                            
111. See id. at 774–76 (citations omitted) (setting forth factors that could be seen to 
constitute a removal of habeas protections, including: substantial departure from common law 
habeas procedure, whether the purpose and effect of a particular statute was to restrict the writ, 
and whether the statute substituted some new collateral process for habeas review). 
112. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 46–7 (describing the Rule of Non-Inquiry as a partial 
judicial delegation of decision making responsibility to the Secretary); id. at 267–69 (noting 
the near unanimous judicial acknowledgment that the Executive is better suited to inspect, 
monitor, and safeguard the conditions an extraditee may face in the requesting State); 
BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 940 (acknowledging that the Rule of Non-Inquiry generally 
prohibits habeas courts from inquiring into the treatment the extraditee is likely to receive in 
the requesting State). 
113. See The Supreme Court 2007 Term Leading Cases: II. Federal Jurisdiction and 
Procedure: B. Habeas Corpus: Jurisdiction over Americans Held Overseas, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 405, 415 (2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (citing Hoxha v. Levi, 
465 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2006)) [hereinafter Jurisdiction over Americans Held Overseas] 
(referring to the Rule of Non-Inquiry as a judge made doctrine limiting the scope of judicial 
review in extradition); see also David B. Sullivan, Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiry in 
International Extradition, 15 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 116 (stating the Rule of 
Non-Inquiry is often invoked when an extraditee challenges extradition on the basis of the 
expected treatment in the requesting State). 
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punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe . . . .”114  
Further, the Rule recognizes that some branches of the federal 
government are comparatively more able to address foreign policy 
questions than the courts.115 As a result, the Rule of Non-Inquiry only 
restricts review by the Judiciary and does not prohibit the Executive 
Branch from examining the conditions in the requesting State.116 The 
Executive Branch, through the Secretary of State, is thought to be in 
the best position to review Article Three claims regarding the 
potential for mistreatment in the requesting State and to potentially 
refuse extradition because they have the ability to investigate the 
conditions in a foreign country and precondition extradition on 
assurances by the foreign government regarding the specific 
conditions that await an extraditee.117 Even prior to implementing 
obligations under the CAT, the Secretary of State had a clear policy 
of refusing extradition where torture was likely.118  
                                                            
114. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901); see also Jurisdiction over 
Americans Held Overseas, supra note 113, at 415. As a consequence, courts reviewing habeas 
petitions in extradition cases have historically been limited to reviewing questions related to 
the Executive’s authority to extradite, the validity of the applicable extradition treaty, and 
other narrow questions. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (per curiam) (enumerating the specific 
issues generally addressed in habeas). 
115. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 47 (observing that the Rule of Non-Inquiry’s 
decision making delegation to the Executive Branch is particularly evident in cases involving 
political or humanitarian concerns); Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, 
and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
1198, 1229–30 (1991) (arguing that US courts are less able to navigate foreign policy interests 
than the Secretary). 
116. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 636 (stating that the Executive branch may inquire 
into the treatment facing an extraditee and refuse to surrender, at its discretion); Peroff v. 
Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099, 1102–03 (4th Cir. 1977) (noting, in dicta, the Rule of Non-Inquiry 
applies to the Judiciary while simultaneously allowing the Executive to be flexible). But see 
BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 638 (observing increasing dicta in US courts indicating a 
willingness to erode the Rule of Non-Inquiry if there is evidence that the extraditee will face 
torture in the requesting State). 
117. See John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and Human Rights Treaties, 45 CATH. 
U.L. REV. 1213, 1217 (1996) (noting the Rule of Non-Inquiry is premised upon the Secretary’s 
ability to exercise independent discretion to deny extradition); BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 611 
(defining diplomatic assurances as formal representations from a competent representative of 
the requesting State regarding an individual’s extradition); ABBELL, supra note 10, at 300–04 
(explaining that, as a matter of Executive discretion, the Secretary of State imposes conditions 
to which the requesting State must agree before extradition can occur); Munaf v. Geren, 553 
U.S. 674, 701–02 (2008) (citations omitted) (explaining that the political branches are better 
suited to address issues affecting the ability of other sovereign nations to exercise jurisdiction 
over fugitives from their justice system). 
118. See Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (reporting, prior to US 
ratification of the CAT, that the United States did not and would never extradite a person to a 
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The Rule of Non-Inquiry was recently reaffirmed by a 
unanimous Supreme Court in Munaf v. Geren, which applied the Rule 
of Non-Inquiry within the military detainee context, holding that 
“habeas is not a means of compelling the United States to harbor 
fugitives from the criminal justice system with undoubted authority to 
prosecute them.”119 The Court consolidated the habeas petitions of 
two individuals detained by the United States military, both men were 
dual US-Iraqi citizens who had voluntarily traveled to Iraq.120 The 
petitioners challenged their transfer to Iraqi criminal custody on the 
grounds that they would face torture in Iraqi custody.121 The Court 
noted that principles of international comity and respect for foreign 
States prohibit courts from shielding citizens from foreign 
prosecutions.122 
The Munaf Court believed that the petitioners’ torture claims 
were best addressed by the political branches, not the Judiciary.123 It 
explained that the Judiciary was not suited to second-guess the 
Executive’s determinations in this area, which would require courts 
not only to judge foreign justice systems but also to undermine the 
Government’s ability to speak with one voice in foreign relations.124  
According to the Court, the Judiciary lacked the significant 
diplomatic leverage and tools possessed by the political branches.125 
Further, the Court noted that denying habeas review did not end the 
                                                                                                                                     
country where it was known he would be tortured); cf. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 
952, 962–63 (rehearing en banc) (Tallman, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (“I cannot question so 
lightly the honor of the Secretary . . . .”). 
119. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 697 (2008); accord John T. Parry, International 
Extradition, the Rule of Non-Inquiry, and the Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1973, 
1976 (2010); Juarez-Saldana v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) 
(arguing that the Court, in Munaf, reaffirmed the principles supporting the Rule of Non-
Inquiry). 
120. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 679 (describing the facts underlying the case). 
121. See id. at 700. 
122. See id. at 698–99 (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) 
(Brown, J., dissenting in part) vacated by 553 U.S. 674. 
123. See id. at 700 (using the Rule of Non-Inquiry from extradition cases to limit the 
scope of habeas review in the military detainee context); Id. at 700–01 (citing Neely v. Henkel, 
180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901)) (explaining how inter-branch comity had a long history in the 
Court’s jurisprudence). 
124. Id. at 702. The Court also recognized that the Judiciary was not well suited to 
second-guess decisions of foreign justice systems. See id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, (J. 
Madison) (“If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other 
nations.”)). 
125. Id. at 703 (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d at 20 n.6 (Brown, J., dissenting in 
part) vacated by 553 U.S. 674). 
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petitioners’ ability to advocate their position as the Executive retained 
discretionary power to decline to surrender them to Iraqi 
authorities.126 Finally, the Court noted that US policy prevented 
transfer where torture was likely.127 
Article Three claims like Trinidad y Garcia’s pose several 
unique issues, such as the CAT’s effect on an extraditee’s petition for 
review of the Secretary’s Article Three determination.128 Although St. 
Cyr, Boumediene, and Munaf do not involve the CAT or the FARR 
Act, like Trinidad, they did set the stage for Part II by explaining the 
difficulty courts have framing a petitioner’s claims and interpreting 
statutes that affect a court’s habeas jurisdiction. First, Part I discussed 
habeas corpus jurisprudence in the United States, using St. Cyr and 
Boumediene as examples to demonstrate the constitutional nature of 
habeas protections and the applicable canons of statutory 
interpretation needed to understand the arguments explored in 
subsequent Parts of this Note.129 Second, Part I explained how the 
Court’s unanimous opinion in Munaf reaffirmed the principal that 
international extradition is a unique process in the US legal system, 
with a historically limited scope of review.130  
II. THE CAT, THE FARR ACT, AND STATE DEPARTMENT 
REGULATIONS HAVE CAUSED TREMENDOUS CONFUSION 
AMONG US COURTS  
The jurisprudence surrounding habeas review of extraditees’ 
Article Three claims is inconsistent, and courts are split at several 
different levels of the analysis.131 Some jurists differ on whether or 
not a cognizable claim exists on habeas, and even among those that 
                                                            
126. Id. at 702 (describing the role of the Secretary).  
127. Id. at 702 (explaining that the Solicitor General stated that it was US policy not to 
transfer if torture were likely and that while torture concerns remained in Iraq, torture was not 
believed to be practiced by Justice Ministry, to whom petitioners would be transferred). 
128. Compare Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 955–57 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(rehearing en banc) (per curiam) (framing the Article Three claim requesting judicial review of 
the Secretary’s Article Three determination as constitutional), with Juarez-Saldana v. United 
States, 700 F. Supp. 2d 953 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (refusing to find a statutory grant of 
jurisdiction over Article Three claims from the FARR Act). 
129. See supra notes 71–111 and accompanying text 
130. See supra notes 119–127 and accompanying text. 
131. Compare Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 955–57 (comparing the Article Three claim to a 
petition for review of Executive detention), with Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 142–43 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (interpreting a foreign national’s Article Three claim as asking for review of an 
erroneous statutory interpretation). 
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agree that the claim exists, there is disagreement about whether it is 
the type of claim that implicates the Suspension Clause or was created 
by subsequently enacted laws, namely the FARR Act.132 Other courts 
believe that Congress has effectively stripped courts of jurisdiction to 
hear the claim.133  
Part II examines these different points of view using the various 
opinions from Trinidad as a roadmap. Exploring the per curiam 
decision, Part II.A considers different arguments regarding whether 
Article Three claims are cognizable in habeas. Part II.A.1 examines 
the reasoning behind the per curiam opinion in Trinidad and other 
cases holding that Article Three claims implicate the Suspension 
Clause and thus require using the rules of statutory interpretation from 
St. Cyr. Part II.A.2 then considers the second part of the per curiam 
opinion in Trinidad, which says that the cause of action for Article 
Three claims has been created by statutes or regulations implementing 
the CAT. Part II.B then addresses the effect that various statutes, 
including the FARR Act and the REAL ID Act, discussed in 
Trinidad, have had on Article Three claims. Specifically, Part.II.B 
examines whether Congress is free to take away from courts the 
habeas jurisdiction that is created in prior statutes.  
A. Finding the Source of Article Three Claims 
Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 2241 allows courts to hear habeas 
petitions when the petitioner’s custody violates the US 
Constitution.134 The Supreme Court, in turn, has explained that a 
habeas petitioner states a cognizable constitutional claim when the 
claim implicates the Suspension Clause, and that the Suspension 
Clause is implicated, at a minimum, when the claim is of the same 
type that a detainee could have brought in 1789.135 Part II.A addresses 
these issues in the context of an extraditee’s Article Three claim.  
                                                            
132. See, e.g., Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 1009 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (stating that 
Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three claim was not cognizable on habeas); Mironescu v. Costner, 
480 F.3d 664, 674 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that § 2242(d) of the FARR Act only created 
habeas jurisdiction for Article Three claims in the immigration context). 
133. See Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the language 
of the REAL ID Act effectively stripped courts of habeas jurisdiction, if any ever existed for 
military transferees). 
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 
135. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (describing 1789 as the absolute 
minimum of the protections of the Suspension Clause); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 
739 (2008) (characterizing legal precedents and commentaries regarding habeas corpus in 
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1. Article Three Claims and the Suspension Clause—Looking to 
History to Frame the Claim 
The manner in which a court frames a petitioner’s Article Three 
claim is crucial to its analysis.136 Courts often look to historical 
precedent and examine whether the same general type of claim would 
have been available to the petitioner in 1789, and therefore whether it 
implicates the Suspension Clause.137 In the extradition and detainee 
transfer context, there is disagreement among jurists and scholars 
about whether Article Three claims would have been cognizable in 
1789.138   
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Trinidad marked the first 
decision from a US Circuit Court of Appeals that “extended judicial 
review of habeas corpus petitions in extradition to [Article Three 
determinations].”139 The court first considered whether it had 
jurisdiction to hear Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three claim and held 
that, as a noncitizen challenging Executive detention, Trinidad y 
Garcia’s claim historically would have been protected in habeas.140 In 
his concurrence, Judge Thomas went even further, arguing that even 
if jurisdiction had only been created by 28 U.S.C. § 2241, removing 
jurisdiction in this particular context would remove all forms of 
judicial review for Trinidad y Garcia’s claim, which was so contrary 
                                                                                                                                     
1789 as instructive). But see id. at 746 (recognizing that the Court has been careful not to say 
that the Suspension Clause protects only what it protected in 1789). 
136. Compare Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 955–57 (9th Cir. 2012) (framing the Article Three 
claim as constitutional and finding habeas jurisdiction), and Wang, 320 F.3d at 142–43 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (same, in immigration context), with Juarez-Saldana v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 
2d 953 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (framing the Article Three claim as seeking review of the 
conditions in the foreign country and not finding habeas jurisdiction). 
137. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 15, (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Boumediene, 533 U.S. at 746) 
(arguing that the historical scope of habeas mattered, and guided the “question before [the 
court]”); Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 676 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing 1789 as a 
benchmark for reviewing Article Three claims). 
138. See Vladeck, supra note 15 (noting the split between US Circuit Courts regarding 
habeas jurisdiction over Article Three Claims); Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 969 (Tallman, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the court’s per curiam ruling created a circuit split). But see, e.g., 
Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1182, 1183 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2004) (demonstrating agreement in 
the immigration context of the effect of jurisdictional statutes on habeas proceedings). 
139. Stover, supra note 6, at 327–28; see Vladeck, supra note 15 (noting the split 
between US Circuit Courts regarding habeas jurisdiction over Article Three Claims). 
140. While the court was not explicit on this point, it seems that the court is arguing that 
by virtue of the Constitutional underpinning of Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three Claim, 
jurisdiction was technically provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as the per curiam decision based its 
holding on due process. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956. 
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to the purpose of the Suspension Clause that such a result would 
violate the Constitution.141 
While habeas protections are strongest in the context of 
Executive detention, some courts argue that Article Three claims in 
the extradition context do not seek review of the legality of Executive 
detention and therefore conclude that habeas review is improper.142  
For example, in his partial dissent in Trinidad, Chief Judge Alex 
Kozinski criticized the per curiam’s authors for over-generalizing 
Trinidad y Garcia’s claim.143 In his view, Trinidad y Garcia did not 
challenge “the authority of the Executive to extradite him,” but rather, 
he challenged the destination he would be extradited to: the 
Philippines.144 As there was no support for the proposition that habeas 
courts had ever reviewed an extraditee’s treatment abroad, there was 
no basis for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.145  
In Chief Judge Kozinski’s view, St. Cyr was easily 
distinguishable because refusing to hear Trinidad y Garcia’s claim 
could create no constitutional question.146 This was because “[a] 
serious constitutional question would only arise if [the court] 
interpreted a statute to preclude the type of habeas review protected 
by the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.”147 Instead, Trinidad y 
Garcia’s claim was essentially one of statutory and regulatory 
interpretation, which did not fall under the category of claims that 
                                                            
141. See id. at 959–60 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that Suspension Clause was 
intended to provide a judicial forum for inquiry into the causes of Executive detention, and 
reading the FARR Act to remove all judicial forums would violate the intent of the Suspension 
Clause); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a 
prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States . . . .”). 
142. Compare Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 199 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting I.N.S. 
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)) (explaining that habeas protections are strongest in the 
context of Executive detention), with Omar, 646 F.3d at 25–29 (Griffith, J., concurring) (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (explaining that the Article Three Claim of the petitioner, a military detainee, was 
not eligible for habeas review). 
143. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 1010 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (explaining that 
his colleagues characterized Trinidad’s claim “at too high a level of generality . . . .”). 
144. Id. at 1011 (“Trinidad y Garcia . . . challenges . . . the destination to which the 
Executive seeks to extradite him . . . .”). 
145. See id. at 1009–11 (framing the history of extradition case law in terms of the Rule 
of Non-Inquiry). Chief Judge Kozinski elaborated on his statutory interpretation by noting that 
the FARR Act and the REAL ID Act “explicitly disavow any congressional intent to create 
jurisdiction for review of CAT claims outside a limited immigration context.”  Id. at 1010. 
146. See id. at 1010 (explaining that St. Cyr did not apply because, unlike the case at bar, 
there was no historical evidence that Trinidad y Garcia’s claim was cognizable on habeas). 
147. See id. at 1010–11 (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314). 
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implicate the Suspension Clause—i.e., claims cognizable in 1789.148 
Because Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three claim was narrower than 
his colleagues suggested, Chief Judge Kozinski would have dismissed 
Trinidad y Garcia’s claim for lack of jurisdiction.149  
Similar to the discord regarding the application of St. Cyr to 
Article Three claims, jurists and scholars have disagreed on the 
applicability of Munaf  to Article Three claims.150 On remand from 
the Supreme Court in Munaf, the D.C. Circuit heard the amended 
habeas petition of Shawqi Omar, who asked the court to consider 
whether the FARR Act and Article Three of the CAT could be used to 
enjoin his transfer to Iraqi custody.151 Omar argued that he was 
entitled to habeas review because his claim implicated the Suspension 
Clause.152 The court read the Munaf decision as categorical and held 
that, as a military detainee, Omar was not in a class that possessed a 
right to judicial review of the conditions he might face upon 
transfer.153 This was because “[h]abeas corpus [was] not a valid 
means of inquiry into the treatment the [petitioner] is anticipated to 
                                                            
148. See id. at 1010 (contrasting Munaf, where the Court considered constitutional 
claims, to the current case). 
149. See id. at 1011–12 (quoting Semmelman, supra note 115, at 1218 (“[n]o court has 
yet denied extradition based upon the defendant’s anticipated treatment in the requesting 
country.”).  
150. Compare Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 19–21 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that 
military transferees could not historically bring habeas petitions in these situations), with 
Vladeck, supra note 15 (arguing that Munaf was explicitly limited to its facts and should not 
control Article Three claims in the extradition context), and Parry, supra note 119, at 2015 
(expressing surprise that the Court in Munaf did not go further to expressly ban all inquiry).  
151. The Supreme Court in Munaf declined to reach Omar’s Article Three claim, as he 
had not advanced it in his initial habeas petition. Moreover, the Court expressed doubt that 
Omar could present a cognizable claim under the FARR Act. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 16–17 
(citing Munaf, 553 U.S. at 703 n.6.). Omar was one of the petitions whose claim was heard by 
the Supreme Court in Munaf. His amended petition was brought before the D.C. Circuit on 
remand from Munaf. See Omar, 646 F.3d 13. 
152. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 704 (quoting Brief for Habeas Petitioners 54) (noting that 
the Petitioner argued that the Constitution prevented the Government from transferring him to 
Iraq “without legal authority”). 
153. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 19–21 (explaining that military transferees could not 
historically bring habeas petitions in these situations). The court dispatched Omar’s Due 
Process argument quickly, noting that Munaf also foreclosed Omar, as a military transferee, 
from making this argument. See id. at 20 (“[T]the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in Munaf 
that transferees such as Omar (indeed, Omar himself) do not possess a habeas or due process 
right to judicial review of conditions in the receiving country.”); cf. Mironescu v. Costner, 480 
F.3d 664, 671 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that extraditees could not claim constitutional 
entitlement to habeas review of post extradition treatment “prior to the CAT and the FARR 
Act”). 
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receive in the requesting state.”154 By contrast, one scholar 
distinguishes the Article Three claim in Trinidad from Munaf by 
noting that the Munaf decision was expressly limited to its facts, as 
indicated by the Justices’ opinions.155 First, Chief Justice Roberts, 
writing for a unanimous court, noted that the Secretary had already 
determined that the detainees in Munaf would not be tortured, a 
determination that was not reflected in the record before the court in 
Trinidad.156 Second, Justice Souter explained in his concurrence that 
the result likely would be different in a situation where the probability 
of torture was well-documented but the Executive failed to 
acknowledge it.157 The discord regarding the application of Munaf 
and St. Cyr squarely demonstrates the heart of the issue addressed in 
this Note and in Trinidad: whether extraditees have a constitutional 
right to habeas review for Article Three claims. Many jurists, 
however, would only consider this to be the first half of the analysis.  
2. Article Three Claims and the FARR ACT—Looking to Statutes to 
Frame the Claim 
If the right to habeas does not directly stem from § 2241’s 
jurisdictional grant over constitutional questions, habeas may be 
supported by reading the FARR Act in conjunction with a 
constitutional right.158 For example, the per curiam opinion in 
Trinidad looked to the FARR Act’s implementing regulations and 
interpreted them to create an obligation on the Secretary to review the 
petitioner’s claim, thus creating a procedural due process interest 
reviewable in habeas.159 That due process interest, however, was 
limited, and the per curiam would only require the Secretary to 
                                                            
154. Omar, 646 F.3d at 19 (citing Munaf, 553 U.S. at 700). 
155. See Vladeck, supra note 15. 
156. See id. (explaining that the Court settled the merits of Munaf’s claim by looking to 
the Secretary of State’s assurance that the petitioners would not face torture, which had not 
occurred in Trinidad). Article Three in Trinidad claim was further distinguishable because 
Munaf explicitly chose not to address any issues related to the FARR Act, as they were not 
raised by the parties. See id. 
157. See Vladeck, supra note 15 (discussing Justice Souter’s concurrence in Munaf). 
158. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing 
en banc) (per curiam) (holding that the FARR Act and its implementing regulations, which are 
binding domestic law, require the Secretary to determine that an extraditee is not more likely 
to be tortured than not). 
159. See id.  
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provide the court with a declaration confirming that she complied 
with her duties under Article Three of the CAT.160   
In contrast, Judge Pregerson’s concurrence in Trinidad argued 
that the Secretary’s “closed” review process and the significant 
consequences of any error in her Article Three determination required 
courts to exercise habeas review of Article Three claims.161 Although 
cognizant of the serious concerns surrounding classified information, 
Judge Pregerson argued that the district court, in camera, was able to 
review the underlying evidence of Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three 
claim.162 Similarly, Judge Berzon read the FARR Act and the CAT to 
require some manner of habeas inquiry that accessed the sufficiency 
of the Secretary’s evidence and conclusions.163 According to Judge 
Berzon, habeas is, first and foremost, an adaptable remedy.164 
Because of this, he went on to propose a novel “Rule of Limited 
Inquiry,” which would frame the scope and process of habeas review 
on a case by case basis, by balancing the severity of the Secretary’s 
foreign policy concerns against the perceived risk of torture readily 
apparently from the preexisting extradition record.165   
Limited judicial review of Article Three claims was also 
discussed by the Fourth Circuit in Mironescu v. Costner, where the 
court explained in dicta that a district court, in camera, is well-suited 
to deal with the real and substantial confidentiality concerns 
associated with Article Three claims.166 In Mironescu, the Fourth 
Circuit held that the Rule of Non-Inquiry did not bar habeas review of 
                                                            
160. See id. at 956–57 (instructing the Secretary of State, upon remand, to provide a 
declaration that she “complied with her obligations”); see also Nelinson, supra note 17, at 
237–38 (referring to the lack of judicial oversight of the Secretary’s Article Three 
determination as an “explicit derogation of [the CAT]”);  Stover, supra note 6 (arguing that the 
lower courts should take a more proactive role in hearing Article Three claims in the first 
instance). 
161. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 1008 (referring to the Secretary’s declaration as 
“barebones”); cf. Vladeck, supra note 15 (criticizing this formulization for allowing the 
Secretary to make these petitions “go away” by “merely by filing a piece of paper”). 
162. See Trinidad 683 F.3d at 1008 (arguing for the district court to review Trinidad y 
Garcia’s claim in camera). 
163. See id. at 987 (Berzon, J., concurring) (arguing that if the Secretary approved 
extradition without making a determination regarding Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three claim, 
that would “illegal under positive, Congressionally enacted law”). 
164. See id. at 997 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008)). 
165. See id. at 997–99 (proposing a Rule of Limited Inquiry); see also Nelinson, supra 
note 17, at 251–52 (supporting Judge Berzon’s formulation of judicial review).  
166. See Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 673 (4th Cir. 2007) (expressing 
confidence in the ability of the district court to protect the confidentiality of communications 
between the Executive and foreign governments). 
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the extraditee’s Article Three claims because the CAT and FARR Act 
created a due process right to have his extradition preceded by an 
Article Three determination.167 The Rule of Non-Inquiry could not 
bypass the court’s duty to ensure that the Executive complied with its 
constitutional duties.168 The Mironescu court reasoned that a district 
court could only ensure this compliance by examining the evidence 
underlying the Secretary’s Article Three determination.169  
Other jurists have adopted a different reading of the FARR Act 
and the REAL ID Act to conclude that because the statutes say 
nothing about creating jurisdiction in the extradition context, they 
should not be read to do so in conjunction with either the Suspension 
Clause or § 2241.170 For example, both Chief Judge Kozinski, in his 
dissent in Trinidad, and the D.C. Circuit, in Omar, have noted that the 
FARR Act only addresses habeas review in the immigration context, 
and therefore it cannot be read to create a cause of action for Article 
Three claims in any other context.171 Similarly, Judge Tallman’s 
dissent in Trinidad argued that the FARR Act’s policy statement 
created no individual rights, and was mere policy, not law.172 Lastly, 
the D.C. Circuit explained that since the FARR Act, the REAL ID 
Act of 2005 had been enacted, which contained explicit language 
limiting habeas review to the immigration context.173 Because Article 
Three claims do not implicate the Suspension Clause, the D.C. Circuit 
                                                            
167. Although Mironescu was decided before Munaf, it reaches the same conclusion as 
Vladeck, supra note 15, by similarly arguing that the Rule of Non-Inquiry does not apply to 
Article Three claims. Mironescu, 480 F.3d at 673 (holding that the Rule of Non-Inquiry did 
not bar review of the Secretary’s Article Three determination).  
168. See Mironescu, 480 F.3d at 673  (acknowledging the Constitution as the supreme 
law of the land). 
169. See id. (contending that the Secretary’s compliance must be subject to judicial 
review). 
170. See, e.g., Jaurez-Saldana v. U.S., 700 F. Supp. 2d 953, 960 (holding that the text of 
the FARR Act cannot be read to create habeas jurisdiction for an extraditee’s Article Three 
claim). 
171. See, e.g., Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (per curiam) (concluding that the FARR 
Act and REAL Id Act confirm the absence of habeas jurisdiction); Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 
13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that the FARR Act’s language only provides for judicial 
review in the immigration context). 
172. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 975–77 (explaining that the FARR Act did not create 
binding law, but was an example of Congress legislating “by innuendo,” or guiding the 
Secretary in making the ultimate regulations that would have the force of law). 
173. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 18 (holding that, even if some source of habeas jurisdiction 
could be found for petitioners, the language of the REAL ID Act effectively stripped courts of 
habeas jurisdiction outside the immigration context). 
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did not apply St. Cyr’s statutory cannons to the REAL ID Act, further 
bolstering its argument against finding a statutory basis for Article 
Three claims in habeas.174   
Because 28 U.S.C. § 2241 allows courts to hear habeas petitions 
when the petitioner’s custody violates US laws, treaties, or the 
Constitution, courts addressing Article Three claims must first decide 
whether an extraditee presents a cognizable habeas claim.175 Part 
II.A.1 began by considering whether Article Three claims implicate 
the Suspension Clause, therefore supporting a constitutional basis for 
habeas jurisdiction.176 Part II.A.2 examined whether these claims 
could have been created after 1789 by the CAT, the FARR Act, or its 
implementing regulations.177 Part II.B continues by discussing the 
next issue courts address in Article Three claims—whether 
Congressionally-enacted statutes have stripped courts of jurisdiction 
to hear the petitioner’s claim.  
B. Has Congress Stripped Courts of Habeas Jurisdiction Over Article 
Three Claims? 
Even among those that find some basis to support a petition for 
the writ, there is disagreement regarding whether the CAT’s 
implementing legislation (the FARR Act) and regulations strip courts’ 
habeas jurisdiction to hear Article Three claims.178 Some courts, in 
comparing the text of the FARR Act with the statutes analyzed in St. 
Cyr, note the near identical language and hold that the FARR Act 
does not effectively strip jurisdiction, however this holding requiring 
the application of St. Cyr’s canons of statutory interpretation.179 For 
                                                            
174. Id. at 24 n.11 (stating that the Article Three claim brought by a military detainee or 
an extraditee did not state a constitutional claim). 
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 
176. See supra notes 136–157 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra notes 158–1774 and accompanying text. 
178. Compare Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2007) (interpreting the 
FARR Act to prohibit habeas review of Article Three claims outside the immigration context), 
with Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en banc) per 
curiam) (explaining that the FARR Act didn’t have a sufficiently clear statement to strip 
habeas jurisdiction). 
179. See Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2006) superseded by 
statute, REAL ID ACT of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, div. B, § 106(a)(4), May 11, 2005, 119 Stat. 
310–11, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 note, as recognized in Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 647 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (holding, in an immigration context, that the statutory language examined in St. Cyr 
as “closely mirror[ing]” the language in the FARR Act). See generally Trinidad, 683 F.3d 952 
(applying the canons of statutory interpretation used by the Supreme Court in St. Cyr). 
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example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Trinidad held that 
because Trinidad y Garcia’s claim was historically protected in 
habeas, the canons of statutory interpretation used in St. Cyr 
controlled, meaning that Congress could not strip habeas jurisdiction 
without a “particularly clear statement” demonstrating congressional 
intent to strip.180 Even if a statute has a sufficiently clear statement, 
the opinion noted that courts must address whether an alternative 
interpretation of the statute, that does not raise a potentially difficult 
constitutional question, is possible.181 According to a majority of 
judges, the FARR Act lacked a sufficiently clear statement to strip 
jurisdiction.182 Further, the REAL ID Act, which the court read to 
contain a sufficiently clear statement to strip habeas jurisdiction, 
could also be alternatively interpreted as only affecting Article Three 
habeas jurisdiction in the immigration context—an interpretation that 
the court felt would not offend the Constitution.183 
By contrast, after holding that the extraditee had a due process 
right to have an Article Three determination, the Fourth Circuit in 
Mironescu held that the FARR Act’s language was sufficient to strip 
that right.184 The Fourth Circuit distinguished St. Cyr by explaining 
that St. Cyr’s statutory interpretation was premised on the fact that, in 
the immigration context, there are substantial differences between the 
terms “judicial review” and “habeas corpus.”185 Because there was no 
such distinction of those terms in the extradition context, the court 
interpreted the FARR Act’s use of “judicial review” to also preclude 
                                                            
180. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956 (requiring a clear expression of congressional intent 
to strip habeas jurisdiction).  
181. See id. (explaining that Supreme Court precedent mandates adopting 
constitutionally sound interpretations of statutes if fairly possible). 
182. See id. This is all the per curiam opinion said on this subject, but they cited to Saint 
Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 200–02 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that the FARR Act did not 
explicitly refer to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, or to habeas review generally, and so Supreme Court 
precedent counseled against reading it as stripping habeas jurisdiction) and Wang v. Ashcroft, 
320 F.3d 130, 140–42 (2d Cir. 2003) (interpreting St. Cyr as requiring a statute to mention 
either “habeas corpus” or “28 U.S.C. § 2241” before it can be sufficient to repeal habeas 
jurisdiction) for support. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956.  
183. See id. (finding an alternative interpretation of the REAL ID Act). 
184. See Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 676 (4th Cir. 2007) (refusing to require 
Congress to always explicitly mention habeas corpus or § 2241 to effectuate a repeal of habeas 
jurisdiction). 
185. See id. at 676 (arguing that St. Cyr, as an immigration case, was distinguishable 
because in the immigration context, the terms habeas corpus and judicial review have 
“historically distinct meanings”).  
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habeas review for Article Three claims.186 The court explained that 
the Supreme Court had never explicitly stated that Congress must 
mention “habeas” or “§ 2241” to bar habeas review, and so it adopted 
what it interpreted to be the FARR Act’s unambiguous demonstration 
of Congressional intent.187 
Still other courts have found the language of the REAL ID Act 
sufficient to strip habeas jurisdiction over Article Three claims.188 In 
Omar, the D.C. Circuit stated that even if the FARR Act created a 
judicially enforceable right, Congress retained the right to 
subsequently remove that right without having to adhere to St. Cyr’s 
statutory canons.189 According to the court, to hold otherwise would 
advance a “one-way ratchet theory” of habeas protections, where any 
expansion of habeas rights by Congress would essentially be treated 
as an amendment to the Constitution.190 If the petitioner sought to 
enforce a right created by the FARR Act, that right would be, by 
definition, a statutory right.191 Article Three claims could not gain the 
protections of the Suspension Clause merely because they were 
labeled habeas claims.192 Because the petitioner’s claim was not of a 
class that was historically cognizable in habeas, no constitutional 
problems arose by stripping the court’s jurisdiction and the 
petitioner’s right to bring the claim.193 Therefore, the court did not 
apply St. Cyr’s rules of statutory interpretation, and it read the plain 
                                                            
186. See id. at 676 (reading the FARR Act’s preclusion of habeas jurisdiction to include 
the consideration of Article Three claims). 
187. See id. at 666 (noting that even though the Supreme Court had implied that would 
require such language, until it did, they would not adopt such a stringent view). 
188. See, e.g., Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
189. See id. at 22 (arguing that congress does not amend the constitutional protections of 
the writ when it adds some new statutory protection to habeas petitioners). 
190. See id. at 22–23 (dismissing the logic underpinning this one-way ratchet theory); 
see also Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384–85 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (finding no 
constitutional problem when Congress partially retracts statutory enlargement of habeas 
rights);  I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 342 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (labeling this one-
way ratchet argument as “too absurd to be complicated”). But see Neuman, supra note 90, at 
590 (arguing that Scalia’s dissent in St. Cyr incorrectly assumed that the Suspension Clause’s 
protections are fixed by Eighteenth Century practice). 
191. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 22 (explaining that statutory expansions of the writ of habeas 
corpus do not alter the scope of the Suspension Clause). 
192. See id. at 23 (citing LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1998)) 
(explaining that curtailing an optional statutory enlargement of habeas corpus does violate the 
Constitution). 
193. See id. at 22 (reasoning that even if the FARR Act created habeas jurisdiction, the 
REAL ID Act subsequently stripped that jurisdiction without any constitutional problem). 
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language of the REAL ID Act as clearly precluding habeas review of 
Article Three claims outside the immigration context.194 
There is a short history underlying the jurisprudence of Article 
Three claims.195 Part II summarized the conflicting opinions of US 
jurists and scholars attempting to interpret murky Supreme Court 
precedent from Munaf, St. Cyr, and Boumediene. The disagreement 
among jurists is based partly on the fact that Article Three claims can 
be framed in many different ways, each requiring a very different 
analysis.196 Further, even among courts that reach the same result, 
they do not necessarily rely on the same legal reasoning to reach that 
result.197 While Article Three claims present many difficulties, Part III 
will demonstrate that the current state of the law allows for only one 
result. 
III. THE LAW IS CLEAR: US COURTS DO NOT HAVE 
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW EXTRADITEES’ ARTICLE THREE 
CLAIMS IN HABEAS  
Article Three claims are not cognizable in US courts on petitions 
for writs of habeas corpus. Part III.A begins by framing Article Three 
claims and calling them what they really are: requests for judicial 
review of an extraditee’s expected treatment in the requesting State. 
Part III.A.1 explains that this is the only plausible interpretation 
because Article Three claims did not exist historically, and therefore, 
they cannot implicate the Suspension Clause. Moreover, as Part 
III.A.2 argues, neither the CAT nor its implementing statutes and 
regulations created any judicial cause of action. Finally, Part III.A.3 
demonstrates that even if one interprets the CAT, the FARR Act, or 
                                                            
194. See id. at 18 (holding that the petitioner, a military transferee, was not of a class that 
would have historically had access to habeas relief). 
195. The CAT did not enter into force in the United States until 1994, while habeas was 
first codified in the United States with the Judiciary Act of 1789. Compare Garrett, supra note 
63 (explaining that habeas was first codified in the Judiciary Act of 1789), with United States 
Report to CAT, supra note 1, ¶ 3  (stating that the CAT went into force in the United States in 
1994).  
196. See, e.g., Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (per curiam) (arguing that because 
Trinidad y Garcia’s claim did not implicate the Suspension Clause, his colleagues on the Ninth 
Circuit incorrectly applied the canons of constitutional avoidance from St Cyr). 
197. Compare Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664 (applying the canons of 
constitutional avoidance from St. Cyr to find that the FARR Act strips habeas jurisdiction), 
with Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 952 (applying the same canons from St. Cyr to find hold the FARR 
Act did not contain a sufficiently clear statement to strip habeas jurisdiction). 
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its implementing regulations as creating a claim cognizable on habeas 
review, none would preclude Congress from subsequently stripping 
habeas jurisdiction because Article Three claims do not implicate the 
Suspension Clause and the rules of statutory interpretation used in St. 
Cyr’s would not apply. Therefore, the plain text of the REAL ID Act 
would clearly strip courts of jurisdiction to hear the claim. There are 
real and substantial inter-branch and international comity concerns 
that accompany judicial review of the Secretary’s Article Three 
determinations, and Part III.B concludes by recognizing this. 
However, it also recognizes the incredibly high stakes faced by any 
extraditee who makes an Article Three claim. These claims should be 
dealt with as completely and fairly as possible. But as this Note 
concludes, despite the split amount US Circuit Courts, the current 
state of the law is clear, and US courts do not have habeas jurisdiction 
over Article Three claims.  
A. Article Three Claims Ask Courts to Review an Extraditee’s 
Expected Treatment in the Requesting State 
When an extraditee brings an Article Three claim in habeas, the 
first issue a court must address is: what relief is being sought?198 
Article Three of the CAT protects against extradition where there is a 
substantial risk of torture in the requesting State.199 When making an 
Article Three claim to a US court, an extraditee is clearly asking a 
court to determine whether that risk is substantial.200 Courts may 
determine whether there is a substantial risk of torture only by going 
beyond the extradition record.201  
                                                            
198. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
200. See WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 428 (stating the United States interprets 
“substantial grounds” in Article Three to mean that torture is “more likely than not”); 
Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (recommending that Article Three’s 
prohibitions apply where torture is “more likely than not,” the same standard applied in US 
asylum proceedings). 
201. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 203–34 (explaining that the US Government 
generally submits the requesting State’s formal extradition request as evidence in extradition 
hearings); BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 906 (quoting 6 MAJORIE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 998–99 (1963)) (explaining that it is well-established that extradition 
proceedings are not meant to determine guilt or innocence and that an extraditee generally 
cannot introduce evidence that is not specifically required by the applicable treaty).  
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When examining the rights and obligations created by the 
Suspension Clause, history matters.202 The Court has made it clear 
that at a minimum the protections of the Suspension Clause exist as 
they did in 1789.203 Because St. Cyr’s statutory claim could not have 
existed in 1789, the Court had to frame the claim more broadly, as 
challenging the legality of Executive detention, the historic core of 
the writ.204   
1. Article Three Claims Do Not Implicate the Suspension Clause 
Article Three claims cannot be framed so broadly.205 Although 
Article Three of the CAT creates similar obligations for the United 
States in both the immigration and extradition contexts, it does not 
abrogate centuries of extradition case law by creating habeas 
jurisdiction for courts.206 Moreover, even though St. Cyr noted that 
habeas protections are strongest in the context of Executive detention, 
the court implicitly recognized that that was an inappropriately broad 
level of abstraction, and discussed at length how immigration case 
law supported habeas review.207 Boumediene is further 
distinguishable because an extraditee does not face the prospect of 
indefinite Executive detention.208 Although extradition habeas is 
limited in scope by the Rule of Non-Inquiry, it still provides 
extraditees an “affirmative right to judicial inquiry into the causes of 
[their] detention.”209 In reality, Article Three claims do not seek 
judicial review of the causes of detention, but rather a determination 
                                                            
202. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008) (explaining the importance of 
seeking historical guidance in habeas cases); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304 (2001) 
(describing the understanding of habeas corpus in 1789 as the “absolute minimum” of the 
protections of the Suspension Clause).  
203. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 304.  
204. See id. at 301 (indicating that “[a]t its historical core” habeas corpus allowed for 
judicial review of Executive detention). 
205. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1011 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en 
banc) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (per curiam) (refusing to frame the Article Three 
claim before the court as challenging Executive detention). 
206. See Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (reading the FARR Act to 
provide a right to judicial review of Article Three claims only in the immigration context); 
BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 940 (stating habeas corpus has been held by courts not be a valid 
means of inquiry into expected treatment in the requesting State). 
207. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306–07 (discussing the historical application of 
immigration laws in habeas cases challenging Executive detention). 
208. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 788 (discussing the possibility that detention may be 
indefinite). 
209. Id. at 744 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
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that torture is likely, meaning that their surrender to the requesting 
country—their release from United States custody—violates the 
CAT.210 Finally, as the Court noted in Munaf, the Judiciary cannot 
assume that the Executive is oblivious to its humanitarian duties and 
presume that the Secretary of State has decided not to deny 
extradition where denial is required by law.211  
2. Article Three Claims Were Not Created by Statute 
The Suspension Clause protects claims that are of a class that 
would have been cognizable in 1789—this does not include Article 
Three claims.212 In the extradition context, the Rule of Non-Inquiry 
remains in the background.213 Article Three claims are the precise 
type of claim that the Rule of Non-Inquiry forecloses: those that call 
for examining the conditions that an extraditee may encounter upon 
his return to the requesting State.214 Therefore, although the Court has 
never defined the upper limits of the Suspension Clause’s protections, 
it seems unlikely that it would include Article Three Claims.215 
If an Article Three claim is not contemplated by the Suspension 
Clause, then petitioners must argue that it comes from some new 
right.216 That is exactly the argument accepted by the Ninth Circuit in 
Trinidad when they held that the United States’ new obligations under 
                                                            
210. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (noting that release to foreign 
criminal custody is the “last thing petitioners want”). 
211. Id. at 702 (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Brown, J., 
dissenting in part) vacated, 553 U.S. 674; accord Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 
962–63 (rehearing en banc) (Tallman, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (“I cannot question so lightly 
the honor of the Secretary . . . .”). 
212. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, supra note at 9, at 940 (stating habeas corpus has been held 
by courts not be a valid means of inquiry into expected treatment in the requesting State); 
Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 1010 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (writing that Trinidad y Garcia 
had not presented any case to support a holding that the Rule of Non–Inquiry allowed for even 
minimal review). 
213. See supra notes 112–27 and accompanying text. 
214. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 267–69 (noting the near unanimous judicial 
acknowledgment that the Executive is better suited to inspect, monitor, and safeguard the 
conditions an extraditee may face in the requesting State); BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 940 
(acknowledging that the Rule of Non-Inquiry generally prohibits habeas courts from inquiring 
into the treatment the extraditee is likely to receive in the requesting State). 
215. See supra Part II accompanying text (discussing various lines of thought related to 
the CAT’s effect on an extraditee’s rights in habeas proceedings). 
216. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (extending the writ of habeas corpus to prisoners only 
where custody violates the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States). 
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the CAT created Trinidad y Garcia’s cause of action.217 Though 
accepted by the Ninth Circuit, this argument is unavailing.218 First, the 
CAT itself did not create the claim because it was not self-executing, 
and therefore not legally binding in US courts.219 Second, neither the 
CAT’s implementing legislation, the FARR Act, nor the subsequently 
promulgated regulations can reasonably be read to create a cause of 
action for an Article Three claim.220 Not only should the FARR Act’s 
broad policy statement not be read to create an individually 
enforceable right, the legislative history clearly demonstrates that 
Congress intended the Secretary of State to remain the competent 
authority to determine whether an extraditee faces a substantial risk of 
torture.221   
3. Even if a Court Erroneously Finds a Jurisdictional Basis for Article 
Three Claims, Congress Has Stripped That Jurisdiction 
Even if a court could read the CAT, the FARR Act, or the 
implementing regulations to create a habeas claim, then the court 
must examine whether Congress has subsequently revoked that 
claim.222 In St. Cyr, the Court explained that the clear statement rule 
                                                            
217. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956–57 (arguing that the FARR Act and its implementing 
regulations, which were binding domestic law, created a cognizable Due Process interest, 
reviewable in habeas). 
218. See id. at 1010 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (explaining that his colleagues 
characterized Trinidad’s claim “at too high a level of generality”); cf. Omar v. McHugh, 646 
F.3d 13, 19–21 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that military transferees could not historically 
bring habeas petitions to argue a claim akin to a modern Article Three claim). 
219. Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 972–72 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (explaining non-self-
ratifying treaties are not binding US law unless Congress enacts implementing statutes); 136 
Cong. Rec. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Statement of Sen. Terry Sanford) (stating that 
Articles 1 through 16 of the CAT are not self-executing). But see United States Report to CAT, 
supra note 1, ¶ 57 (citations omitted) (explaining that US courts may take notice of US 
obligations under a non-self-executing treaty). 
220. FARR Act § 2242(d) (stating that the Act did not provide courts with jurisdiction to 
hear Article Three claims outside the immigration context); 22 C.F.R. § 95.4 (describing the 
Secretary’s Article Three Determinations as matters of Executive discretion, not subject to 
judicial review); accord Omar, 646 F.3d at 17 (stating that the FARR Act’s language only 
provides for judicial review in the immigration context. 
221. See Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (reporting that the Secretary of 
State is the “competent authority” under existing law, and that the United States did not and 
would never extradite a person to a country where it was known he would be tortured); 
Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 
69–72 (1990) (letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S. 
Dept. of State, to Sen. Clairborne Pell) (clarifying that the Secretary will remain the competent 
authority in extradition). 
222. See supra notes 178–97 and accompanying text. 
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requires that a statute must unambiguously state its intention to 
revoke habeas review when such a revocation would create “a serious 
Suspension Clause issue.”223 The Court’s definition of the Suspension 
Clause creates a very clear floor: 1789.224 While Boumediene made it 
clear that the protections of the Suspension Clause can be expanded, 
there has never been any indication that it has expanded to include 
Article Three claims.225 Further, the CAT, which entered into force in 
the United States in 1994, and the FARR Act, which was signed into 
law in 1998, simply have not existed for a long enough time to create 
a right to judicial review that is so foundational in US law that its 
revocation could create serious constitutional issues.226   
In contrast to the short history of the CAT’s binding legal status 
in the United States, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed over a 
century of well-settled extradition case law—i.e., the Rule of Non-
Inquiry—demonstrating that inquiring into the extraditee’s expected 
treatment in the requesting State is the exact opposite of 
foundational—it is forbidden.227 Therefore, neither the CAT, the 
FARR Act, nor the REAL ID Act constitutes a removal of habeas 
rights, as defined in Boumediene.228 First, none require courts to 
depart from common law habeas procedures because the common law 
is framed by the Rule of Non-Inquiry.229 None limit the status quo of 
                                                            
223. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001). 
224. See id. at 301 (describing 1789 as the absolute minimum of the protections of the 
Suspension Clause). 
225. See Neuman, supra note 89, at 589 (explaining how the Boumediene Court chose 
not to even attempt to elaborate the full scope of the protections of the Suspension Clause). 
226. See Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (arguing that Congress 
does not amend the constitutional protections of the writ when it adds some new statutory 
protection to habeas petitioners); supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing the CAT’s 
implementation in the United States). 
227. See supra notes 112–27 and accompanying text (discussing the Rule of Non-Inquiry 
and its importance to the Court’s holding in Munaf). 
228. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774–76 (2008) (citations omitted) (setting forth 
factors that could be seen to constitute a removal of habeas protections, including: substantial 
departure from common law habeas procedure, whether the purpose and effect of a particular 
statute was to restrict the writ, and whether the statute substituted some new collateral process 
for habeas review). 
229. Compare supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing factors that could be 
seen to constitute a removal of habeas protections), with BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 940 
(acknowledging, that in the extradition context, the Rule of Non–Inquiry generally prohibits 
habeas courts from inquiring into the treatment the extraditee is likely to receive in the 
requesting State). 
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judicial involvement in habeas review.230 Secondly, their “purpose or 
effect” is not to restrict the writ, as they cannot restrict the writ in a 
situation to which it has never applied.231 Because Article Three 
claims do not implicate the Suspension Clause, their revocation by 
Congress would not create serious constitutional questions.232 As 
such, the clear statement requirement used in St. Cyr does not apply; 
normal canons of statutory interpretation do.233 Therefore, even if a 
court read the FARR Act as creating a cognizable habeas claim, the 
REAL ID Act clearly revoked that claim by clarifying that only 
immigration detainees had a right to judicial review of the conditions 
in the requesting State.234 
B. Supreme Court Precedent Makes It Clear that the Rule of Non-
Inquiry Precludes Habeas Review of Article Three Claims 
Historically, courts have followed the Rule of Non-Inquiry, and 
kept the scope of habeas review in extradition very narrow.235 The 
Rule of Non-Inquiry has its underpinnings in principles of 
international comity and horizontal separation of powers between the 
branches of the Federal Government; these concerns existed in the 
                                                            
230. Compare supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing factors that could be 
seen to constitute a removal of habeas protections), with BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 880 
(describing the scope of an extradition hearing), and BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 930–36 
(explaining the process and scope of habeas in extradition). 
231. Compare supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing factors that could be 
seen to constitute a removal of habeas protections), with BASSIOUNI, supra note at 9, 940 
(stating habeas corpus has been held by courts not be a valid means of inquiry into expected 
treatment in the requesting State); c.f. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1012 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (per curiam) (arguing that 
the there was not, nor had there ever been any jurisdiction basis for Trinidad y Garcia’s Article 
Three claim). 
232. See Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (arguing that Congress 
does not amend the constitutional protections of the writ when it adds some new statutory 
protection to habeas petitioners); Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 1010–11 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in 
part) (arguing that an Article Three claim does not implicate the Suspension Clause).  
233. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (explaining that whenever a statute 
invokes the outer limits of congressional power, the Court will require a clear expression that 
Congress intended that particular result); Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 1010–11 (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting in part) (arguing that, because an Article Three claim is not constitutional in nature, 
there is no need to require a clear expression of congressional intent).  
234. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 18 (holding that the language of the REAL ID Act 
effectively stripped courts of habeas jurisdiction, if any ever existed for military transferees). 
235. See supra notes 112–27 and accompanying text (discussing the Rule of Non-
Inquiry). 
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nation’s early history, and they exist today.236 Although Munaf 
concerned the transfer of military detainees, its affirmance of the 
principals underlying the Rule of Non-Inquiry was critical to its 
holding.237  
Congress is of course free to amend the current law and expand 
the scope of habeas review to include Article Three claims.238 
However, as the Court made clear in Munaf, not only is the Judiciary 
ill-suited to examine the substance of the Secretary’s Article Three 
determinations, judicial review would damage American foreign 
affairs and the Executive’s ability to speak with one voice.239 Further, 
Munaf reaffirmed another longstanding principal that US courts 
should not pass judgment on foreign legal proceedings or systems.240 
Therefore, the Court’s decision in Munaf only makes it clearer that 
US Courts are not the proper forum for an extraditee’s Article Three 
claim.  
Some courts and commentators, perhaps inadvertently, have 
implied that the Secretary may not always comply with Article Three 
of the CAT in the extradition context.241 If the potential for torture or 
mistreatment in the requesting State is ever at issue, the Secretary is 
required to consider the risk of torture, and cannot issue a Surrender 
Warrant if there are substantial grounds to believe torture is more 
                                                            
236. See Quigley, supra note 117, at 1217 (1996) (noting the Rule of Non-Inquiry is 
premised upon the Secretary’s ability to exercise independent discretion to deny extradition); 
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 701 (2008) (citing The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 
Cranch 116, 143) (explaining that the political branches are better suited to address issues 
affecting the ability of other sovereign nations to exercise jurisdiction over fugitives from their 
justice system). 
237. See Parry, supra note 119, at 2015 (discussing the extradition precedents that the 
Court used to support its decision in Munaf); Juarez-Saldana v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 2d 
953, 957 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (arguing that the Court, in Munaf, reaffirmed the principles 
supporting the Rule of Non-Inquiry). 
238. See supra notes 158–97 (discussing Congress’s ability to amend the scope of 
habeas review within the limits of the Suspension Clause). 
239. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (J. Madison) 
(recognizing that the Judiciary is not well suited to second-guess decisions of foreign justice 
systems (“If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other 
nations.”)). 
240. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 699–700 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398 (1964)) (discussing the Act of State doctrine). 
241. See Vladeck, supra note 15 (criticizing the lack of review required in Trinidad as it 
would allow the Secretary to make Article Three claims “go away” “merely by filing a piece 
of paper”); Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702 (refusing to question, as the petitioner requested, that the 
Secretary complied with her humanitarian duties); Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 
962–63 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en banc) (Tallman, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (criticizing 
the other judges in the Ninth Circuit for questioning the “honor of the Secretary”). 
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likely than not.242 Additionally, as part of the Secretary’s de novo 
review of the extradition request, the Secretary will consider any 
submissions from the extraditee.243 Lastly, only the Secretary can 
impose conditions on extradition by requiring the requesting State to 
provide diplomatic assurances regarding humanitarian concerns.244  
CONCLUSION 
Article Three claims are not cognizable in US courts.245 As a 
matter of law, Article Three claims are not of the type that would 
have been cognizable on habeas, nor has Congress subsequently made 
them cognizable.246 As a policy matter, this approach is consistent 
with US extradition practice, consistent with notions of inter-branch 
comity underlying that practice, and consistent with the United States’ 
obligations under the CAT.247 Well before implementing the CAT, 
basic notions of human decency required the Secretary to ensure 
extraditees’ would not face torture in the requesting State—that 
obligation continues today.248 While the CAT created legal 
obligations for the United States, it did not change the federal 
Judiciary’s role in international extradition—only the US Congress 
can do that.249 
This Note sought only to resolve conflicting interpretations of 
the CAT and its implementing statutes and regulations. Many have 
argued that evolving notions of human rights should affect US 
extradition practice.250 This Author does not disagree. However, the 
                                                            
242. See 22 C.F.R. § 95.3 (requiring the Secretary of State to make an Article Three 
determination prior to issuing a Surrender Warrant); Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956–57 (holding 
that the FARR Act and its implementing regulations, which are binding domestic law, require 
the Secretary to determine that an extraditee does not face a substantial likelihood of torture).  
243. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 300–04 (pointing out that the Secretary’s review of 
the extradition de novo and the Department of State generally considers any submissions from 
the extraditee, although it consistently refuses to grant the extraditee any sort of oral hearing) 
244. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing diplomatic assurances). 
245. See supra Part III. 
246. See supra Part III.A. 
247. See supra Part III.B. 
248. Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (reporting that the United States 
did not and would never extradite a person to a country where it was known he would be 
tortured). 
249. See supra notes 158–97 (discussing Congress’s ability to amend the scope of 
habeas review within the limits of the Suspension Clause). 
250. See Nelinson, supra note 17, at 237–38 (referring to the lack of judicial oversight of 
the Secretary’s Article Three determination as an “explicit derogation of [the CAT]”); Stover, 
supra note 6 (arguing that the lower courts should take a more proactive role in hearing Article 
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reality is that the US Supreme Court has not said that evolving 
notions of human rights should affect courts’ interpretations of the 
Suspension Clause.251 The only way to change the current procedures 
surrounding extraditees’ Article Three claims is through 
Congressional action. For the reasons set out above, the Judiciary 
simply is not equipped to ensure compliance with the CAT. However, 
recognizing this does not mean that the Secretary’s review process 
need be as opaque as it was for Trinidad y Garcia.252  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Three claims in the first instance); supra notes 163–65 (discussing Judge Berzon’s proposal 
for a Rule of Limited Non-Inquiry from Trinidad, which would balance human rights concerns 
and international comity concerns to design novel habeas review procedures for Article Three 
claims on a case-by-case basis). 
251. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 697 (2008) (reaffirming the Rule of Non-
Inquiry). It is true that the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Boumediene expanded the protections 
of the Suspension Clause to non-citizen detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but that 
expansion was based on functional factors. See Azmy, supra note 70, at 467 (describing the 
criteria used by the Court to determine the reach of the Suspension Clause as “functional and 
highly subjective”). 
252. Brief for Appellee at 14–25, Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 
2012) (rehearing en banc) (per curiam) (No. 09-56999) 2010 WL 4199736, (discussing 
Trinidad y Garcia’s submission to the Secretary of State, but noting that Trinidad y Garcia was 
denied the opportunity to appear before any decision making body at the State Department); 
accord ABBELL, supra note 10, at 300 (pointing out an extraditee may make submissions to 
the Secretary to consider prior to issuing a Surrender Warrant, although there is no right to a 
oral hearing). 
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